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Group Rates: A Questionable Feature of the Railroad Rate Structure
A practice long used by the railroads in rate-making is the establishment of "group" or "blanket" rates.' A group rate is established by
treating variously located producers or various localities as if they were
all situated at the same place, thus making freight charges identical for
all. Where the area included in the group is extremely large, the resultant
rate is usually referred to as a "blanket" rate.2 At one time, for example,
the entire area east of the Rockies was given a "blanket rate" on certain
shipments to the West Coast.3 The coal mines of Illinois, on the other
hand, divided into numerous rate groups, 4 exemplify the more typical
practice. The mere fact that several towns or producers are put into
a rate group for one purpose does not mean they receive identical charges
for all shipments to and from the group. For example, the fact that manufacturers may be put into a single rate group for the shipment of their
finished product to markets does not mean that identical charges necessarily will be made on shipments of raw materials to them. The group
may exist only for purposes of shipments out of it,5 or into it, 6 or even
only out of it in a certain direction.7 The important thing is that for the
purpose for which the group rate is established, the relative geographic
positions of the various points included in the group are disregarded, and
charges for all shipments are computed on the basis of a central point
within the group. In this respect, blanket or group rates are similar to
basing point pricing systems under which freight charges for all sellers
are computed from a single point, regardless of the actual distance of the
buyer from the seller.3 The basing point system has been subjected to
attack by the Federal Trade Commission for a long time,9 and more recently the Supreme Court has found that such pricing systems constitute
discrimination within the meaning of Section 2 of the Clayton Act, as
amended by the Robinson-Patman Act.10 In view of this development,
it is worthwhile to investigate why and to what extent the Interstate Commerce Commission has permitted the railroads to engage in a practice
which results in price discrimination by depriving localities or manufacturers of their natural geographic advantages.
1. For a general discussion of the problem, see SHARFMAX, THE INTERSTATE
EcoNomics OF
COMMERCE CommISSI0o, Vol. B, pt. III, 656-691 (1936); LocKmL,
TRANSPORTATION 196-99 (3d ed. 1947).
2. Locicu, op. cit. supra note 1, at 197.
3. See Railroad Commission v. Southern Pac. Co., 19 I. C. C. 238, 239 (1910).
4. See Coal to Beloit, Wisconsin, and Northern Illinois, 263 I. C. C. 179, 198

(1945).
5. See Howell v. New York, Lake Erie & W. R. R., 2 I. C. R. 162, 168 (1888).
6. See Avery Manufacturing Co. v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry., 16 I. C. C. 20,
23 (1909).
7. See Wisconsin & Ark. Lumber Co. v. St. Louis, I. M. & S. Ry., 33 I. C. C.
33, 49 (1915) (dissenting opinion).
8. For descriptions of basing point pricing systems, MACHLUP, THE BASINGPOINT SYSTEM 1-30 (1949); see FTC v. Cement Institute, 333 U. S. 683, 696-699

(1948).
9. A brief history of the FTC's attack on the basing point system is given in
Corn Products Refining Co. v. FTC, 324 U. S. 726, 735-6 (1945).

10. 38 STAT. 730 '(1914), as amended, 49 STAT. 1526 (1936), 15 U. S. C.§ 13

(1946); FTC v. Cement Institute, 333 U. S. 683 (1948); Corn Products Refining
Co. v. FTC, 324 U. S. 726 (1945); FTC v. Staley Manufacturing Co., 324 U. S.

746 (1945).
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NOTES
DEVELOPMENT OF

GRouP

RATES

The use of group or blanket rates pervades our railroad rate structure."' An extreme example of its current qpplication is found in the
blanketing of the entire area east of Chicago and Cincinnati for shipments
of citrus fruits from California. 12 This means that a California shipper
can send oranges to New York City for the same charges as to a point
just east of Chicago, approximately 900 miles nearer California. For
many years, likewise, most of Texas received one blanket rate on shipments into it, so that a shipper outside Texas could send goods to almost
any place in the state for the same charge. 13 More usually a group covers
a much smaller area and joins all producers of a single product in a given
region, or in several towns which distribute to a common surrounding
territory. It is the almost universal practice to group coal mines this
way; 14 and similar groupings,
for example,
are found among potato
17
16
growers,'6 lumber mills, and lime kilns.
Various reasons can be given to explain the adoption of group rates
by railroads. First, it is a method of simplifying tariff schedules; 18 by
using rate groups, the railroads are able to avoid the difficulty of having
to compute the distances and charges for each point within the group.
Very often, again, group rates can be explained as a result of carrier
competition to carry the traffic to or from a particular region. An illustration of this lies in the development of transcontinental rail rates. The
earliest transcontinental lines originated on the east coast. On shipments
from the east coast, water carrier competition kept rates low, but since
there was no such competition from inland points, the transcontinental
rates from inland points were computed by adding the rail rate from the
point of origin to the east coast, to the rate from the east to the west
coast. Accordingly, during this period, rates on shipments to the west
coast increased as one moved westward. Then, with the construction
of transcontinental lines originating in the middle west, during the 1880's,
pressure developed for the adoption of rates based on distance. Otherwise,
as long as rates were lower from the east than from the middle west,
the bulk of the traffic would originate in the east. The adoption of rates
graduated from east to west followed. In 1894, however, a violent rate
war broke out between the eastern railroads and the water carriers, driving the transcontifiental rates down drastically. At the same time the
eastern rail carriers were faced with the competition from mid-western
lines for traffic originating from inland points. The consequence was an
agreement of all the carriers, in 1898, to the establishment of a blanket
11. See, e.g., Eastern Class Rate Investigation, 164 I. C. C. 314, 323 (1930).
12. Hearings before Subcommittee on Trade Policies of the Senate Committee

on Interstate and Foreign Commerce on S. R. 241, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. (1948);
Arlington Heights Fruit Exchange v. Southern Pac. Co., 22 I. C. C. 149 (1911).

13. See Dallas Freight Bureau v. Missouri, K. & T. Ry., 12 I. C. C. 427, 429

(1907).
14. See Coal to Beloit, Wisconsin, and Northern Illinois, 263 I. C. C. 179, 198
(1945).
15. See Scott v. Cape Charles R. R., 38 I. C. C. 467, 471 (1916).
16. See Connor Lumber and Land Co. v. Akron, C. & Y. Ry., 40 I. C. C. 111,
112 (1916).
17. See Waukesha Lime & Stone Co. v. Chicago, M. & S. P. Ry., 26 I. C. C.
515, 518 (1913).
18. See Commodity Rates on Lumber and Other Forest Products, 165 I. C. C.
561, 568 (1930) ; LocKiyN, Ecoxomcs OF TRANsPoRTATiO N 198 (3d ed. 1947).
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rate on shipments to the west coast from all points east of the Mississippi

River.' 9 Similarly, carrier competition for traffic to various towns which
distributed goods throughout a common area was settled by adoption
involved. This explains the establishment
of the same rate to all the towns
20
of Texas as one rate group.
An6ther cause of grouping was the adoption of Section 4 of the Interstate Commerce Act,2 1 which prohibited charging more for a short haul
than for a longer one over the same line. Prior to its adoption, points
served by two or more railroads had, in many cases, received lower
charges, because of carrier competition to carry goods to those points,
than intermediate points closer to the shipping point which were served
by only one of the railroads. After the adoption of Section 4, the railroads often gave the intermediate points, which had previously paid more,
the same rate as more distant points at which there was competition, with
the result that a rate group was formed.2 2 Rate groups were also initiated
by railroads to encourage the location of particular types of industry along
their lines. A carrier would make the same freight charge to a common
market, for new manufacturers locating their plants along its lines, as
it made for manufacturers of like products already located there, even
though the new plants were more distant from the market 2 3 Similarly,
carriers would extend their lines into new coal or other natural resource
regions and encourage development of the mines all along the line, rather
to the market, by making the same freight charge
than only those closest
24
to the market for all.

THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION'S ATTITUDE TOWARD
GROUP RATES
From its very inception the Interstate Commerce Commission has
been confronted with the problem of group rates. Its early decisions established the proposition that group rates were not illegal per se, but
were open to attack in every instance and w6uld be eliminated if complainants could make a proper showifig of damages.2 5 Adhering to this
policy, the Commission has continued to allow the railroads to establish
group rates. It has, however, consistently refused to initiate them 26 and
has occasionally refused to compel a railroad to maintain a group rate
which the railroad desired to discontinue. 27 This somewhat inconsistent
position can be explained by the Commission's policy, enforced by the
19. JONES, PRINCIPLES OF RAILWAY TRANSPORTATION 166-171

(1925); see Busi-

ness Men's League v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry., 9 I. C. C. 318, 323 (1902).
20. See Dallas Freight Bureau v. Missouri, K. & T. Ry., 12 I. C. C. 427, 429
(1907).
21. 24 STAT. 80 (1887), 49 U. S. C. §4 (1) (1946).
22. LOCKLIN, ECONOMICS OF TRANSPORTATION 198 (3d ed. 1947) ; Texas & Pac.
Ry. v. I. C. C., 162 U. S. 197 (1896) (holding that § 4 does not prohibit like rates
for hauls of different distances); see Howell v. New York, L. E. & W. R. R., 2
1. C. C. 162, 173 (1888).
23. See Whiterock Quarries, Inc. v. Pennsylvania R. R., 266 I. C. C. 157, 163
(1946); VANDERBLUE & BuRGEss, RAILROADS 151 (1923).
24. HEALy, THE ECONOMICS OF TRANSPORTATION 240

(1940).

25. Howell v. New York, L. E. & W. R. R., 2 I. C. R. 162, 174 (1888).
26. See, e. g., International Agricultural Corp. v. Louisville & N. Ry., 22 I. C. C.
488, 494 (1912) ; Arlington Heights Fruit Exchange v. Southern Pac. Co., 22 I. C. C.
149, 156 (1911). Contra: Anaconda Copper Mining Co. v. Director General, 78
I. C. C. 549 (1923), rev'd on rearguntent, 144 I. C. C. 433 (1928).
27. Lumber BetweenPoints in Official Territory, 214 I. C. C. 493, 523 (1936).
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courts, 28 of refusing to regulate economic conditions deliberately under the
guise of rate making. 29 For the Commission to require railroads to
charge all shippers in a certain area the same amount on shipments to the
same point, regardless of the differences in distances of the various shippers, would be economic regulation. The carriers regulate economic conditions when they establish a group rate, but their act has been justified
as an effort of each railroad to increase its traffic by enabling shippers along
its line to meet the market prices of other sellers in a given market.8°
The Commission, therefore, has classified grouping as a bona fide method
of increasing a railroad's business, taking it outside the prohibition against
regulating rates to equalize economic conditions. 31 Furthermore, the
Commission's fundamental concern in this field has been with discrimination. The Commission could hardly find that a refusal to make the same
charge for hauls of varying length constituted discrimination and required
replacement by a group rate, 32 but it is readily arguable that a carriercreated group rate does not constitute the undue discrimination prohibited
by the Act.33
The Commission's approval of group or blanket rates has been influenced by other considerations. Probably the most influential one is
that group rates allow more producers to enter a given market on 3a4
basis of apparent equality with the result that competition is promoted.
It is here that advocates of the basing point system and proponents of
group rates join forces.3 5 The Commission also feels that the increased
sources of supply made available by a group rate are desirable for consumers, because, with numerous sources, consumers will be damaged less
if one source becomes temporarily unavailable. 36 Grouping has been
37
treated as particularly applicable to areas containing natural resources,
as a method of enabling a general development of the entire area rather
than only that part of it which is most advantageously located in relation
to the market. This consideration, however, seems more closely related
28. See, e. g., I. C. C. v. Diffenbaugh, 222 U. S. 42, 46 (1911).

29. See, e. g., Elk Cement and Lime Co. v. Baltimore & Ohio R. R., 22 I. C. C.

84, 88 (1911).
30. Dutton Lumber Corp. v. New York, N. H. & H. R. R., 151 I. C. C. 391,

412 (1929); Bituminous Coal to Central Freight Association Territory, 46 I. C. C.

66, 119 (1917): Cast Iron Pipe from North Carolina Points, 38 I. C. C. 183, 186
(1916); SHARFMAN, op. cit. supra note 1, at 656.

31. Lake, Discrimination by Railroads and Other Public Utilities-Preerencesto
Patroisin a Given Locality, 25 N. C. L. REv. 273, 276 (1947).
32. Anaconda Copper Mining Co. v. Director GenerKl, 144 I. C. C. 443, 446-447

(1928).
33. See, e. g., Bituminous Coal to Central Freight Association Territory, 46
I. C. C. 66. 119 (1917) ; Waukesha Lime & Stone Co. v. Chicago, M. & S. P. Ry.,
26 I. C. C. 515, 518 (1913) ; Desel-Boettcher Co. v. Kansas City So. Ry., 12 I. C. C.
221, 222 (1907).
34. See, e. g., Wisconsin and Ark. Lumber Co. v. St. Louis, I. M. & S. Ry., 33
I. C. C. 33. 38 (1915) : Waukesha Lime & Stone Co. v. Chicago, M. & S. P. Ry.,
26 I. C. C. 515, 518 (1913) ; Kansas City Transp. Bur. v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry.,
16 I. C. C. 195, 203 (1909) ; Fetter, The Econwmic Law of Market Areas, 38 Q..
EcoN. 520, 523 (1924).

35. SomE FACTORS IN THE PICING OF STEEL 25 (TNEC Monograph 42, 1941);
SEN. REP. No. 27, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 9-12 (1949). In this report, the position of
the Interstate Commerce Commission approving group rates is cited as directly contrary to the Federal Trade Commission's arguments that competition is promoted

by f. o. b. pricing.

•

36. Iron Ore Rate Cases, 41 I. C. C. 181, 216 (1916); see, e. g., Howell v.
New York, L. E. & W. Ry., 2 I. C. C. 162, 174 (1888).

37. See Wisconsin & Ark. Lumber Co. v. St. Louis, I. M. & S. Ry., 33 I. C. C.

33, 37-38 (1915).
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to conservation than it does to regulation of railroads. The fact, also, that
vested interests have been built up in reliance on a group rate and would
be damaged by its termination has been a very important consideration
influencing the Commission to continue an existing group rate when it is
challenged.38 Finally, group rates have been justified as a necessary
where
method of simplifying the tariff structures of railroads,3 9 even
40
those structures are founded basically on the distance principle.
Although the general attitude of the Commission seems to be that
group rates are such a well established feature of the rate structure that
their general propriety can hardly, be challenged, 41 any particular group
is still open to challenge. The general standard applied by the Commission in determining the legality of a rate group is that the group must not
unduly discriminate against interested parties.4 2 In determining whether
there is undue discrimination the Commission looks primarily at two
considerations: first, the size of the group in relation to the length of the
haul; 43 second, positive injury suffered by the complaining party.44
As a general proposition, it may be said that the longer the haul
the larger the size of the group may be. 45 This follows from the fundamental principle of railroad rate making that as the length of the haul
increases the cost per mile declines. 46 Differences in distance which are
small in proportion to the total distance carried, will make only a small
variation in the cost of the freight bill. Where the difference in the
freight bill which is eliminated by the group rate is small, there is less
reason for the Commission to find that the rate unduly discriminates
against the shipper who is deprived of his geographical advantage. The
Commission has, on several occasions, laid down standards as to how
large a group can be in relation to the length of the haul. In Western
Trunk Lines Class Rates4 7 for example, the Commission ruled that both
origin and destination groups not exceeding 30 miles in diameter were
permissible, provided the base points 48 in each group were at least 400
38. See, e. g., Federated Metals Corp. v. Pennsylvania R. R., 161 I. C. C. 287,
288 (1930); Bituminous Coal to Central Freight Association Territory, 46 I. C. C.
66, 143 (1917); Kansas City Transp. Bur. v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry., 16 I. C. C.
195, 203 (1909).
39. See Commodity Rate on Lumber and Other Forest Products, 165 I. C. C.
561, 568 (1930).
40. Ibid.
41. The New York Harbor Case, 47 I. C. C. 643, 712 (1912).
42. See Bituminous Coal to Central Freight Association Territory, 46 I. C. C.
66, 119 (1917) ; Waukesha Lime & Stone Co. v. Chicago, M. & S. P. Ry., 26 I. C. C.
515, 518 (1913); Southwestern Missouri Miller's Club v. Missouri, K. & T. Ry., 22
I. C. C. 422, 424-25 (1912); Black Mountain Coal Land Co. v. Southern Ry., 15
I. C. C. 286, 292-3 (1909); Desel-Boettcher Co. v. Kansas City So. Ry., 12 I. C. C.
221, 222 (1907).
43. Grain and Products, Oregon, Idaho, Utah to Pacific Coast, 268 I. C. C.
707, 728-9 (1947) ; Arkansas Rice Traffic Bureau v. Aberdeen & Rockfish R. R., 219
1. C. C. 5, 52-3 (1936) ; Livestock-Western District Rates, 176 I. C. C. 1, 85 (1931)
Mitchell v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry., 12 I. C. C. 325, 326 (1907).
44. Mason City Brick & Tile Co. v. Chicago, M. S. P. & A. R. R., 258 I. C. C.
312, 313 (1944) ; Southwest Virginia Lime Producers Ass'n v. Aberdeen & Rockfish
R. R., 218 I. C. C. 189, 194 (1936); Graff-Kittanning Clay Products Co. v. Atlantic
City R. R., 218 I. C. C. 765, 773 (1936); Bradley & Woertz v. Illinois Cent. R. R.,
118 I. C. C. 233, 235 (1926); Howell v. New York, L. E. & W. R. R., 2 I. C. R.
162, 175 (1888).
45. Cases cited note 43 supra.
46. HEALY, THE EcoNomics oF TRANSPoRTATiON 209 (1940).
47. 164 I. C. C. 1 (1930).
48. The "base point" in a group is that point from which rates for the group
are computed.
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miles apart, and that origin and destination groups of 50 miles in diameter
were proper if the base points were 800 miles apart. 49 On another
occasion the test established was that the diameter of a group should not
exceed 10%o of the distance from the nearest point in the group to the
destination in question.50 Such standards are not rigidly adhered to, 51
although, for the most part, groups approved do not exceed them.
It is a fundamental requirement for a successful attack on a group
that the complainant make a showing of positive injury. 2 Where the
market is sufficiently large to absorb the output from the entire group,
the Commission has seldom found injury to the nearer producers which
would justify elimination of the group rate. 53 The test apparently applied is not whether the nearer producers would have been able to do
more business without the rate group, but rather whether it reduced
their existing absolute business or proportionate share of the total business. 54 If nearer producers have only been able to take a small part of a
large increase in business, or have suffered a decline in business, their
injury may be sufficient to justify alteration or elimination of the group.
There are various other less important considerations influencing the
Commission in any action on a group rate. Where the group rate is
established "for a single industrial unit," the Commission is more likely
to give its approval. 55 An area constitutes a single unit when the producers within it" produce like products and compete with one another.
On this basis, Dallas, Forth Worth, and Denton, Texas for example, have
been included in a single group,5 6 as have also St. Paul and Minneapolis,
and Duluth and Superior. 57 The fact that a group rate is of long
standing will also be influential ,with the Commission, 58 although it has
consistently maintained that the mere fact does not make it lawful.5 9 A
related consideration is that where the group rate is a part of a carefully
adjusted set of rate relationships which may be disturbed by a rearrangement of the group, the Commission will be less willing to change it than
otherwise. 60 Finally, the Commission often has placed considerable reliance on testimony of both shippers and carriers that they approve the arrangement. 6
49. Western Trunk Line Class Rates, 164 I. C. C. 1, 198 (1930).

50. Livestock-Western District Rates, 176 I. C. C. 1, 86 (1931).
51. See Livestock-Western District Rates, 176 I. C. C. 1, 89 (1931).
52. See SHARFMAN, op. cit. supra note 1, at 674; cases cited note 48 supra.
53. See Howell v. New York, L. E. & W. R. R., 2 I. C. R. 162, 175 (1888).
54. See Whiterock Quarries, Inc. v. Pennsylvania R. R., 266 I. C. C. 157, 163
(1946) ; Milk Producers' Protective Association v. Delaware, L. & W. R. R., 7 I. C.
C. 92, 166 (1897).
55. See Consolidated Southwestern Cases, 211 I. C. C. 575, 588 (1935) ; Western
Trunk Line Class Rates, 164 I. C. C. 1, 197 (1930).
56. Consolidated Southwestern Cases, 211 I. C. C. 575, 588 (1935).
57. Western Trunk Line Class Rates, 164 I. C. C. 1, 197 (1930).
58. See Graff-Kittanning Clay Products Co. v. Atlantic City R. R., 218 I. C. C.
765, 773 (1936); Federated Metals Corp. v. Pennsylvania R. R., 161 I. C. C. 287,
288 (1930); Bituminous Coal to Central Freight Association Territory, 46 I. C. C.
66, 143 (1917).

59. See

SHARFMAN,

op. cit. mipra note 1, at 668.

60. See Southwest Virginia Lime Producers' Ass'n v. Aberdeen & Rockfish R. R.,
218 I. C. C. 189, 194 (1936).
61. See Whiterock Quarries, Inc. v. Pennsylvania R. R., 266 I. C. C. 157, 164
(1946) ; Cotton, Woolen, & Knitting Factory Products, 211 I. C. C. 692, 779 (1935) ;
Livestock-Western District Rates, 176 I. C. C. 1, 85 (1931) ; Bituminous Coal to
Central Freight Ass'n Territory, 46 I. C. C. 66, 143 (1917) ; Southwestern Missouri
Millers' Club v. Missouri K. & T. Ry., 22 I. C. C. 422 (1912).
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DESIRABLE?

The obvious objection to group rates is that they deprive the favorably located producer of his advantageous location. The nearer producer
pays a higher freight charge so that the more distant producer can pay
less. In simple terms, assuming that the carrier makes only an adequate
return on the total traffic from the group, the result of group rates is
that the nearer producer subsidizes the more distant one. It means that
the carrier collects something analogous to "phantom freight" on the
hauls from the closer points and does the equivalent of "absorbing
freight" 62 on the longer hauls. If the existing demand could be satisfied by more intensive use of the nearby facilities, or by the location of
more producers in the nearby areas, the adoption of a group rate will
result in a higher consumer price, measured by the amount of additional
freight which must be paid because producers have not been forced to
locate themselves naturally in the most advantageous spot in relation to
the market. Grouping protects the uneconomically located producer. 3 0 4
"Cross hauling" is another evil which may result from group rates.
Because of like transportation costs, if f. o. b. prices are identical, purchasers will not necessarily buy from the producer located nearest them.
This results in cross shipment of the same product, and adds needlessly
to the total freight bill which must be paid by the nation.
The main argument of the Commission for its support of group rates
is that if it were not for grouping, nearby producers would acquire a
natural monopoly. 65
This contention overlooks various considerations
which seriously impair its validity. First, it is based on the erroneous
assumption that all producers' costs are the same. To the extent that
more distant producers operate at costs below those who are nearer, they
can absorb an increase in freight and continue to compete. Similarly,
other producers can absorb an increase in freight rates by accepting
profits below the general level. And even if all manufacturers have equal
costs, the nearby producer's advantage is limited by the potential competition which will enter the field if his prices and profits become excessive.
Nor will grouping always successfully place all competitors on an equal
basis. 66 If one producer, located nearer the raw materials used, and another,
located nearer the market, are both put in the same group for purposes
of shipments to the market, the producer nearer the raw materials is
given an artificial advantage over the one nearer the market.6 7 Again, the
producer nearer the market may have paid a higher price for his property
than the more distant producer.6"
62. "Phantom freight" is collected under a basing point pricing system where the
point from which goods are actually shipped is closer to their destination than the
point from which the freight charge is computed, i. e., the basing point. Freight is
"absorbed" where the reverse is true, i. e., where the basing point is closer to the
destination than the point of actual shipment. For a brief explanation, see FTC v.
Cement Institute, 333 U. S. 683, 696-699 (1948).
63. SHARMAN, op. cit. supra note 1, at 690-691.
64. LocK LN, op. cit. supra note 1, at 190.
65. See Graff-Kittanning Clay Products Co. v. Atlantic City R. R., 218 I. C. C.
765, 773 (1936); Wisconsin & Arkansas Lumber Co. v. St. Louis, I. M. & S. Ry.,
33 I. C. C. 33, 37 (1915); Waukesha Lime & Stone Co. v. Chicago, M. & S. P.
Ry., 26 I. C. C. 515, 518 (1913); Kansas City Transp. Bur. v. Atchison, T. & S. F.
Ry., 16 I. C. C. 195, 203 (1909); LocmLn, op. cit. supra note 1, at 190.
66. See Dutton Lumber Corp. v. New York, N. H. & H. R. L, 151 I. C. C. 391,
418-19 (1929) (Comm'r Eastman dissenting).
67. Ibid.
68. Ibid.
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It is always argued that since business and commerce have developed
in reliance on group rates, they should be preserved, since any change in
the system would do much harm. The Commission has frequently given
expression to this attitude, 69 in spite of the fact that it has announced that
no rate becomes proper solely because it has been in existence for a long
time.70 Group rates gain no validity from such an argument: at best it
is only a reason why the Commission should deal with the problem in a
conservative manner.
WOULD ELIMINATION

OF GRouP RATES CONSTITUTE ECONOMIC

REGULATION BY THE COMMISSION?

Through rate regulation both the Commission and the railroads, which
normally initiate rates in the first instance, 71 necessarily exercise a large
measure of control over our economic structure. 72 As part and parcel of
this, whatever policy the Commission adopts toward group rates will have
some effect on our economy, and becomes, therefore, at least in part a
question of economic policy. Since the Commission has not condemned
group rates up to now, a change of attitude might be regarded as primarily
aimed at regulating economic conditions instead of railroad rates, and to
this both the Commission 73 and the courts 74 are opposed. Supporters
of group rates argue that by eliminating them, the Commission would determine that producers heretofore enabled to compete shall no longer be
able to do so, and this, it would be urged, is prohibited economic regulation.
75
Such a view was adopted in Anchor Coal Co. v. United States.

That case involved railroad rates from coal mining groups in Pennsylvania, Ohio and West Virginia to the Great Lakes ports. Originally, the
rates established by the carriers had not reflected the distances of the
various groups from the ports, in order that the more distant West Virginia mines might compete with the nearer ones. Under this differential
the West Virginia mines prospered, while the nearer mines lost business.
The Commission ordered lower rates from the nearer groups to establish
a relation between the nearer and more distant mines more nearly reflecting the differences in distance. It then refused to allow the railroads
hauling coal from the more distant West Virginia mines to lower their
rates to restore the old ratio. The Court held that this was an improper
economic determination by the Commission.
On examination, however, the contention seems specious. The
original purpose of Congress in enacting the Interstate Commerce Act was
to prevent undue discrimination between shippers. 76 It would be logical
69. Cases cited note 38 supra.
70. See note 63 supra.
71. Berge, The Rate Makin Process, 12 LAW AND CONTEMP. PROB. 449 (1947).
72. Comment, 40 YALE L. f. 600 (1931).
73. See Connor Lumber & Land Co. v. Akron C. & Y. Ry., 40 I. C. C. 111, 112
(1916); Elk Cement & Lime Co. v. Baltimore & Ohio R. R., 22 I. C. *C. 84, 88
(1911).
74. See, e. g., I. C. C. v. Diffenbaugh, 222 U. S.42, 46 (1911).
75. Anchor Coal Co. v. United States, 25 F. 2d 462 (S.D. W. Va. 1928), rev'd
on other grounds, 279 U. S.812 (1929). See Lake, Discrimination by Railroads and
Other Public Utilities-Preferencesto Patronsin a Given Locality, 25 N. C. L. Rv.
273, 287 (1947).
76. I. C. C. v. Baltimore & Ohio R. R., 145 U. S.263 (1892). Section 2 of the
Interstate Commerce Act, 24 STAT. 379 (1887), 49 U. S. C. § 2 (1946), makes it
unlawful for a carrier to "directly or indirectly . . . charge, demand, collect, or re-
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for the Commission to find that rates designed to deprive favorably located producers of their geographic advantage constituted undue discrimination. Their elimination would be in accord, therefore, with the purpose
of the Act. But more than that, grouping of various points involves a
conscious economic judgment on the part of the railroads. It is an arbitrary railroad determination of economic policy which the Commission has
been allowing. Rejection of the principle of group rates and imposition
of a distance principle would eliminate third party determination of who
should compete in a given market and allow the producers themselves to
determine that question when they choose their location. Such a step
would be economic regulation only in the sense that it removes power from
the carriers to disturb the natural adjustment of freely competitive producers. The Commission would really be preventing private economic
regulation, not imposing any of its own.
CONCLUSION

There are no reliable indications that group rates can be successfully
77
challenged in the courts. In Ayrshire Collieries Corp. v. United States,
the Supreme Court held recently that it was proper for the Commission
to determine that undue discrimination resulted merely from the fact that
carriers were granting lower rates to some points within a well-established
rate group, without any showing that the rate differential was unrelated
to distance. The Court recognized the long history of rate grouping, and
the Commission's contihued support of groups as a means of equalizing
competition. It found that the Commission was justified in considering
the elemgnt of competition in establishing rate differentials. Finally, it
specifically left open the question of the legality of the entire process of
rate making on a group basis.
The impact of the case would appear to be two-fold. It clearly displays the unwillingness of the Court to enter into a technical analysis of
the correctness of the Commission's decisions as to the composition of
specific groups and the desirability of rate differentials between specific
groups. More interestingly, it seems to grant that the Commission may
make a certain amounf of economic regulation an integral part of its rate
making activities. Certainly there isnothing in the opinion which denies
the right of the Commission to reverse its sympathetic attitude toward
group rates in favor of a more rigorous application of the distance principle. In view of the marked emphasis placed by the opinion on the fact
that the case did not involve any general challenge to rate grouping as a
system of rate making, there may be something in the wind. The similarity of rate grouping to the basing point system recently disapproved
by the Court in the Cement case 78 lends some support to this view.
ceive from any person or persons a greater or less compensation for any service rendered, or to be rendered . . . than it charges, demands, collects, or receives from any
other person or persons for doing him or them a like and contemporaneous service..."
Section 3(1). 24 STAT. 380 (1887), as amended, 41 STAT. 479 (1920). 49 U. S. C.
§ 3(1) (1946), makes it "unlawful for any common carrier . . . to make, give, or
cause any undue or unreasonable preference or advantage to any particular person,
company, firm, corporation, association, locality, port, port district, gateway, transit
point, region, district territory, or any particular description of traffic in any respect
whatsoever; or to subject [them] . . . to any undue or unreasonable prejudice or
disadvantage in any respect whatsoever...
77. 335 U. S.573 (1949).
78. FTC v. Cement Institute, 333 U. S.683 (1948).
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That it is not to be depended upon, however, is evidenced by a later district court decision which rejected the argument that group rates are illegal per se.79
Recent testimony in connection with proposed legislation to legalize
the basing point pricing system shows that currently the position of the
Commission on group rates is somewhat confused.80 Chairman Mahaffie
appeared on behalf of the Commission in opposition to a section of the
bill 81 which he feared would compel the Commission to promote competition. He stated that the Commission always considered competition when
fixing rates, and took a conservative policy toward disrupting rate relations which had sprung from competition, but he denied that the Commission had any general policy of promoting competition through rate
making. Furthermore, he said that any application of the principle of
promoting competition by rate regulation is subject to certain limitations
which prevent its use to promote wasteful competition, to give undue
preferences as between competing shippers, or to deprive parties of natural
geographic advantages! It is difficult to reconcile this statement of principles8 with
the approval which the Commission continues to give to group
2
rates.
For the most part, the Commission has relied on the distance principle in its promotion of a national rate structure,8 3 so as to place shippers
and receivers on a basis of practical equality uninfluenced by private
motives. The Commission should reconsider the relation of rate grouping
to this basic policy. Although the historical development of business in
reliance on rate groups would prevent any violent change of policy, a
start should be made now to get .away from group rates in the future.
T. M. H., Jr.

Liabilities of the Transferor of Non-Negotiable Instruments
Under the Proposed Commercial Code
The decisions regarding the liabilities of a transferor of non-negotiable
commercial paper are a jungle of conflict, comparable to that which existed
in the field of negotiable instruments prior to the enactment of the Nego79. Lynchburg Traffic Bureau v. United States, 84 F. Supp. 1012 (W. D. Va.
1949) (whether such rates were unjustly discriminatory held a question for the Commission, whose* determination must be upheld unless unsupported by substantial evidence). Appeal to the Supreme Court was filed October 4, 1949.
80. Hearings before the Senate Subcommittee on Trade Policies of Senate Colninittee on. Interstate and Foreign Commerce on Sen. Bill 236, 81st Congress, 1st

Sess. (1949).
81. Section 1 of S. R. 241, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. (1948), in which it is stated to
be a policy of the Federal Government, "(a) to develop a consistent and coordinated
program of promoting competition, as affected by transportation costs, in interstate
commerce, by the Federal Trade Commission, the Civil Aeronautics Board, the Post
Office Department, and the Interstate Commerce Commission; (b) to foster competitive private enterprise by the treatment of transportation costs in interstate commerce so that access to distant markets may be available, when economically feasible,
to any competing seller; (c) to encourage the Interstate Commerce Commission to
continue and extend the policy of promoting regional and sectional competition by
the establishment of appropriate transportation rates where required and in the best
interests of the national economy."
82. SHARFMAX, op. cit. mt,6ra note 1, at 684.
83. Daggett, Mileage Rates and the Interstate Commerce Commission, 46 Q. J.

EcoN. 281 (1932).
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tiable Instruments Law,' and which exists even today on a lesser scale.2
Although the commercial importance of non-negotiable paper is dwarfed
by that of negotiable instruments, the fact that there is a substantial
amount of such paper in use in interstate transactions demonstrates the
need for uniformity.3 The proposed Uniform Commercial Code attempts
to meet this need in part, by including within its purview all instruments
which lack words of negotiability but meet all of the other requirements
of negotiability.4 All provisions of the Code relating to commercial paper
are made applicable to such non-negotiable instruments, except that there
can be no holder in due course.5 This raises the interesting question of
what changes are wrought by the Code on the common law of non-negotiable instruments, and to what extent it -viill clarify the law in this field. 6
This Note will attempt to analyze the problem with regard to the liabilities of the transferor of a non-negotiable instrument.
Before proceeding further, it is necessary to make a preliminary
definition of "non-negotiable instrument." 7 The term includes more than
instruments which lack only the requisite words of negotiability, but it
does not include all choses in action which are not negotiable. A nonnegotiable instrument, as the term is used here, is a sort of hybrid,
possessing in use and form many of the characteristics of negotiable paper
but lacking one or more of the formal requisites of negotiability. As will
be shown, the courts have treated this hybrid as negotiable for some
purposes and as a simple chose in action for others.
The liabilities of the transferor of such an instrument may generally
be of two kinds, just as is the case with negotiable paper.8 First, there
is that liability which is incurred by virtue of an indorsement, by means
of which the transferor adds his credit to that of the other obligors on the
instrument. It is in the nature of a promise by the indorser, implied by
law from his mere signing, that he will to some extent stand behind the
instrument he is transferring. Secondly, there is the liability incurred by
virtue of the transferor's status as a vendor, which takes the form of implied warranties by the transferor as to the nature of the instrument transferred. This latter is important only where there is no indorser liability. 9
Although the distinction is at times obscure in cases involving non-negotiable instruments, the two kinds of lability will be treated separately,
since the distinction increases in importance under the- Code. Finally,
the feasibility of extending the Code provisions to non-negotiable instruments which have other defects than lack of words of negotiability will
be considered.
1. Comment, 37 YALE L. J. 102 (1927).
2.- Beutel, Problems of Interpretation Under the Negotiable Instruments Law, 27
Nm. L. REv. 485, 495 (1948).
3. A notable example is the type of long form note held non-negotiable in Overton v. Tyler, 3 Pa. 346 (1846), but which continues in widespread use.
4. UN FORM COMMERCrAL CODE, art.
referred to as CODE).

III, § 805 (May, 1949 Draft) (hereinafter

5. Ibid.
6. For general discussion of the Code provisions on commercial paper see Leary,

Some Clarifications in the Law of Commercial Paper Under the Proposed Uniform
Commercial Code, 97 U. OF PA. L. REv. 354 (1949).

7. Goodrich, Nonnegotiable Bills and Notes, 5 IowA L. BuLL. 65 (1920).
8. Cf. NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW § 66.
9. Cf. Britton, The Liability of a Transferor by Delivery and of a Qualified Indorser, 42 YALE L. J. 25 (1932).
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NOTES
INDORSEMENT OF NoN-NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS

The liability of an indorser of negotiable instruments is based on the

assumption, prompted by commercial need, that the indorser intended to
lend his complete credit to the instrument transferred. Unless the indorser expressly limits his liability, the indorsement is considered a promise
to pay the instrument if the primary obligor does not, provided requisite
procedures are followed. 10 Whether the same policy of requiring an indorser to stand fully behind the paper he transfers should prevail in the
field of non-negotiable paper depends upon whether the business need
exists, even though the need for complete negotiability does not.
Many courts and text writers have recognized that a similar policy
does exist with respect to non-negotiable paper, but there is confused disagreement as to the theoretical basis and the extent of the indorser's liability." A favorite theory is that the indorsement is in effect the drawing
of a new bill of exchange, and that the indorser should therefore be held
to a liability greater than that of a mere assignor. 12 Another line of reasoning, often used in combination with the "new bill" theory, is that the
instrument is "commercial paper," even though non-negotiable, so that the
law merchant regarding indorsements applies.' 3 This group of cases draws
potency from English decisions on promissory notes following the Statute
of Anne.' 4 The Statute was enacted in order to bring promissory notes
within the custom of merchants, after the courts refused to recognize
them as having equal standing with bills of exchange.' 5 Construing the
Statute liberally, the courts held that it brought non-negotiable as well as
negotiable notes within the purview of the law merchant.'0 The significant
point is that, under both theories, the courts conclude that the indorser
is something more than a mere assignor.

A more direct and less confusing

route to the same conclusion would be to determine from an examination
of the instrument and the practices of the business community whether it
is desirable to presume that an indorser in blank promises to stand behind
the paper he transfers.
Nature of the Liability.-If it is concluded that an indorser of nonnegotiable paper promises to stand behind the instrument, both theories
lead to the proposition that liability is the same as if the instrument were
negotiable. If the indorser is considered as the drawer of a new bill,
under the law merchant he would be bound to pay the instrument upon
presentment and notice of dishonor1 7 The result is the same under the
theory that the transferor is an indorser of paper within the custom of
merchants.' 8 In view of the diversity of views at common law, however,
it would be necessary in many instances to hold that the Negotiable Instruments Law applies in order to govern both types of paper by identical
rules. The courts have not been willing to go so far,' 9 and if the common
law of negotiable instruments is applied to non-negotiable paper as well,
10. Broun v. Hull, 33 Gratt. 23 (Va. 1880) ; NEGOTIABLE INsTRUMENTS LAw § 66.
11. See Johnson v. Lassiter, 155 N. C. 47, 51, 71 S. E. 23. 25 (1911) ; STORY,
PROMISSORY
oNo
ms 133 (5th ed. 1859).
12. Leidy v. Tammany, 9 Watts 353 (Pa. 1840) (where court also likened the

indorser to the maker of a new note).
13. De Haas v. Dibert, 70 Fed. 227 (3d Cir. 1895).
14. 3 & 4 ANNE, c. 9, § 1 (1704).
15. Buller v. Crips, 6 Mod. 29, 87 ENG. REP. 793 (Q. B. 1704).
16. Burchell v. Slocock, 2 Ld. Raym. 1545, 92 ENG. REP. 502 (K B. 1728).
17. NEGOTIABLE INSTRUIENTS LAW § 61.

18. Id. § 66.

19. Reynolds v. Vint, 73 Ore. 528, 144 Pac. 526 (1914).
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it often merely substitutes one set of confusion for another, especially with
regard to irregular indorsers. 20 Partly as a result of these difficulties and
partly because of the reluctance of courts to erase distinctions between
negotiable and non-negotiable paper, only a few courts have carried their
theory to the logical conclusion that an indorser of non-negotiable paper is
bound to pay upon presentment and notice of dishonor. 2 '
Some courts, having concluded that an indorser is bound to an extent greater than a mere assignor, hold that his position is that of an
original promisor or surety.22 Such a view holds the indorser of a nonnegotiable instrument to a stricter liability than the indorser of negotiable
paper, since the liability can be imposed without presentment or notice
23
and without even due diligence to collect from the primary obligor.
This is manifestly inconsistent with any theory that the indorser is the
drawer of a new bill, since the drawer is a secondary party entitled to
due proceedings on dishonor, but to some extent it fits into the less popular
view 24that an indorser of non-negotiable paper is the maker of a new
note.
A greater number of courts hold that the indorser is in effect a
guarantor of collectibility, so that the indorsee is required to exercise due
diligence to collect from the primary obligor before the indorser can be
charged. 25 In such cases there is no necessity for formal presentment and
notice, but due diligence requires a prompt suit against the primary obligor,
unless suit is waived by the indorser, or would obviously be of no avail.26
Some of these courts label the indorser an "assignor," and describe his
liability as an implied warranty of the absence of defenses and of the
solvency of the debtor.27 The label is misapplied, since the general rule
'is that an assignor does not warrant the solvency of the debtor.2 8 Moreover, the implied warranties of an assignor of a chose in action are imposed by virtue of the assignor's position as a vendor, without regard to
any indorsement.2 9 Hence, although these courts speak of implied warranties of an "assignor," they are really enforcing a contract of indorsement.
In all of these cases the real question is the extent to which an indorser of a non-negotiable instrument should be presumed to stand behind the paper he transfers, in the absence of any express limitation. 30
To determine this, it will not do to label the indorser a "surety," or
"guarantor of collectibility," and then to allow the usual legal consequences
of such status to ensue. All too often the result is that a conceptually20. Cf. Allen v. Brown, 124 Mass. 77 (1878) ; Elliot v. Moreland, 69 N. J. Law
216, 54 Atl. 224 (1903).
21. Haber v. Brown, 101 Cal. 445, 35 Pac. 1035 (1894) ; Heifer v. Alden, Cutter
& Hull, 3 Minn. 332 (1859); Aldis & Gadcomb v. Johnson, I Vt. 136 (1828) ; cf.
Quinn v. Rike, 50 Cal. App. 243, 194 Pac. 761 (1st Dist. 1920).
22. Nussear v. Hazard, 148 Md. 345, 129 At. 506 (1925) ; Persky v. Bank of
America Nat. Ass'n, 261 N. Y. 212. 185 N. E. 77 (1933) ; Seymour v. Van Slyck, 8
Wend. 403 (N. Y. 1832).
23. See cases cited note 22 supra.
24. See Raymond v. Middleton & Co., 29 Pa. 529, 532 (1858) ; and note 12 supra.
25. Bank of Luverne v. Sharp. 152 Ala. 589, 44 So. 871 (1907); Piascyk v.
Malon, 116 Conn. 418, 165 AtI. 352 (1933); Mazurkiewicz v. Dowholotiek, 111 Conn.
65, 149 Atl. 234 (1930).
26. Ranson v. Sherwood, 26 Conn. 437 (1857) ; Merchants' Nat. Bank v. Spates,
41 W. Va. 27, 23 S. E. 681 (1895).
27. Merchants' Nat. Bank v. Spates, 41 W. Va. 27, 23 S. E. 681 (1895).
28. Maynard v. Maynard, 105 Me. 567, 75 Atl. 299 (1909).
29. See note 9 supra and text.
30. See Comment, 37 YALE L. J. 102, 105 (1927) for view stressing intent of the
parties rather than commercial needs.
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minded court overlooks the real commercial reason underlying indorser
liability, namely, the need for promoting transferability of non-negotiable
commercial paper. It is widely recognized, of course, that such a policy
does exist, but there is very little agreement as to the extent to which the
indorser should be bound. 1 This is due, no doubt, to the conflicting policy,
so strong in the common law, of ascertaining and enforcing the actual
intent of the parties. Carried to its extreme, the latter rule would make
it necessary for the transferee to prove an actual agreement with the
transferor that the latter would pay the instrument if the primary
obligor did not; 32 the policy of commercial need, at the other pole, might
demand an irrebuttable presumption that the indorser intended to make
good the instrument if it were unpaid. 33 Many courts attempt to resolve
the conflict by holding that the indorser liability, whatever its extent, is
merely prima facie, and that the transferor may adduce parol evidence
to prove that his contract was otherwise.3 4 Such a view, although it may
avoid hardship in some cases by ascertaining the actual agreement, prolongs and aggravates the doubt and confusion of the commercial world
as to non-negotiable instruments. 3 5 It seems desirable, in view of modern
conditions, that the policy of commercial necessity should prevail. In
furtherance of that policy it is not unreasonable to require that the indorser expressly limit his liability in the indorsement, if such is his intent.
To Whom Liability Runs.-Irrespective of the nature of the liability of an indorser of non-negotiable paper, it is the prevailing view
that it runs only to the immediate transferee.3 6 Some cases, however,
indicate that it may be shown that the intent of the parties was that liability should run to remote transferees.3 7 The reasoning is that there is
no "privity of contract" with any subsequent holders, and that it cannot
be said, therefore, that the indorser made any promise as to them.38
Since the indorser's name tends to increase the credit of the instrument
even though there is no technical privity of contract, it would not be unjust to have the promise run to subsequent holders. Moreover, such a
rule would further the commercial policy of promoting the transfer of
non-negotiable instruments in any ways not inconsistent with their nonnegotiable character. It is probably too great a step for the courts to
make, but there seems no valid objection to a statutory rule making the
indorser's promise run to subsequent transferees. 3 9 Here40 again, the transferor should expressly limit his liability if he wants to.
As Mere Assignor.-Besides those jurisdictions which recognize indorser liability of some sort on non-negotiable paper, there is a strong
minority that recognize no greater liability of the transferor than that
of a mere assignor, the indorsement being considered no more than a
31. See note 11 supra and text.
32. See Comment, 37 YAtE L. J. 102, 105 (1927).
33. Cf. NEGOTIABLE INsTRU E TS LAW § 66.

This policy of commercial con-

venience reigns supreme in negotiable instruments law.
34. Berry v. Gross, 192 Iowa 300, 184 N. W. 661 (1921) ; cf. Atkinson v. Bennett, 103 Ga. 508, 30 S. E. 599 (1898) (similar rule as to anomalous indorsers of
negotiable instruments at common law).
35. In promoting long range stability, hardship in some cases is inevitable.

See

Chafee, Acceleration Provisionsit Time Paper, 32 HARv. L. REv. 747, 750 (1919).
36. Kendall v. Parker, 103 Cal. 319, 37 Pac. 401 (1894) ; Raymond v. Middleton
& Co., 29 Pa. 529 (1858). See also STORY, PROMISSOmr NOTES 133 (5th ed. 1859).
37. Nuetzel v. Mackie, 80 Cal. App. 768, 253 Pac. 166 (3d Dist. 1927).
38. See cases cited note 36 supra.
39. Cf. CODE § 422.
40. Cf. CODE §205.
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means of assigning. 41 Since the assignor-indorser has not lent credit to
the instrument by placing his name thereon, these cases really hold that
there is no indorser liability as such.42 Some of these cases do recognize,
however, that the transferor may have intended to do more than merely
assign, and admit extrinsic evidence to prove it. 43 If the emphasis is to
be on carrying- out the actual intent of the parties, rather than on business needs and practice, this view is reasonable. Even at that, however,
it seems probable that a person placing his name on the back of commercial paper, negotiable or non-negotiable, usually anticipates that he
will be made to pay if the primary obligor does not. In view of this
likelihood, a rebuttable presumption in favor of indorser liability would
sufficiently protect the exceptional transferor who intended nothing more
than an assignment.44
The conceptual basis for holding that the indorser incurs no greater
liability than that of a mere assignor is that there can be an "indorsement"
in the law merchant sense only of negotiable instruments, and as to all
other choses in action the law of assignments applies.45 This argument
assumes, of course, that only negotiable instruments were subject to the
law merchant. Historically this is inaccurate, the notable example being
non-negotiable promissory notes after the Statute of Anne. 46 If such
mechanical reasoning were avoided, and attention paid instead to present
business practice and needs, these courts would have to conclude that
some instruments lacking a formal requisite of negotiability may nevertheless come within the law merchant as to indorser liability.
Under the Code.-By the inclusion within the Code of instruments
lacking words of negotiability but having all the other formal requisites,
some of the confusion with regard to non-negotiable instruments will undoubtedly be eliminated. 47 The Code does not adopt the majority common law view as to indorser liability, but it does recognize the majority
common law policy that it is desirable to require the indorser of certain
classes of non-negotiable paper to make good the instrument to some extent, unless he specifies to the contrary. 48 Accordingly, the indorser engages to pay the amount of the instrument to the holder or any subsequent indorser who takes it up, provided necessary proceedings on dishonor are taken. 49 Thus, under the Code an indorser stands fully behind his paper, unless he specifies otherwise, a minority view at common law.50 With respect to the parties to whom the promise runs, the
Code departs farthest from the common law which is that the promise runs
only to the immediate transferee. 51 The result does not unduly erase
the distinction between negotiable and non-negotiable instruments, since
41. Hayter v. Dinsmore, 125 Kan. 749, 265 Pac. 1112 (1928) ; Barger v. Farnharn, 130 Mich. 487, 90 N. W. 281 (1902) ; Barnes v. Rowles, 84 Mont. 393, 276 Pac.

15 (1929).

42. But there is liability on the warranties of an assignor.
§ 175 (1932).
43. Steele v. Hudson, 30 Okla. 518, 120 Pac. 616 (1911).

RESTATEMENT, CON-

TRAcTs

44. See note 34 supra and text.

45. Pattee Plow Co. v. Beard, 27 Okla. 239, 110 Pac. 752 (1910).

46. See note 14 supra and text.

47. See Note, 79 A. L. R. 719 (1932).
48. CODE § 805.
49. CODE § 422.
50. The obvious way of specifying otherwise is by qualified indorsement. Cf.
NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTs LAW § 38.
51. Cf. NEGOTIABLE INSTRUmENTS LAW § 66, under which the promise runs to all
subsequent holders in due course.
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even under
the Code there can be no holder in due course of non-negotiable
52
paper.
WARRANTIES OF A TRANSFEROR

The other type of liability is that which the transferor of non-negotiable paper incurs by virtue of his status as a vendor, as distinguished
from his liability as indorser. 53 Just as the vendor of a chattel is held
to make certain implied warranties concerning the thing transferred,
so
54
If
the vendor of a chose in action makes certain implied warranties.
the purchaser of a chose in action sues for breach of such warranties, his
recovery is limited to the damages proved or the consideration paid.55
Manifestly, the remedy is not so efficient as a suit on an indorser's promise
to make good the instrument. As a result, the question of what implied
warranties are made by one who indorses and delivers a non-negotiable
instrument rarely arises in those jurisdictions where there is liability on
the indorsement as such. In the case of negotiable instruments, the
question arises only where proceedings on dishonor have been neglected
or it is desired to bring suit before maturity of the instrument.5 6 Where
the indorser is considered a guarantor of payment the question does not
arise, since there is no requirement of proceedings on dishonor or even
of due diligence. 5 7 If due diligence were required to charge the indorser
on his contract of indorsement, the same neglect which would preclude
liability on the indorsement would probably preclude the liability on implied
warranties. 8
Where the indorser is held to be a guarantor of collectibility, the distinction between indorser liability and liability on implied warranties cannot be made sharply, since both types coalesce in the contract of indorsement. That is to say, the contract of the indorser to pay if the instrument is not collectible by due diligence, of necessity includes warranties
that the instrument is genuine and not subject to undisclosed defenses, as
well as a warranty that the primary obligor is solvent. 5 At any rate, the
cases usually arise as actions on the contract of indorsement, where the
transferee has not been able to collect because of a defense by the primary
obligor, or because of his insolvency.60
As Mere Assignor.-The problem of implied warranties arises
chiefly where the non-negotiable paper is transferred without indorsement, or by qualified indorsement, or where the jurisdiction holds that indorsement and delivery constitute merely an assignment. Inasmuch as a
transfer by delivery is nothing more than an assignment,61 and since a
qualified indorsement ordinarily operates as an assignment, 62 the problem
resolves itself into an inquiry as to the warranties of a mere assignor
52. See Berry v. Gross, 192 Iowa 300, 303, 184 N. W. 661, 662 (1921).

53. See note 9 supra and text.

54. Flynn v. Allen, 57 Pa. 482 (1868); Charnley v. Dulles, 8 W. & S. 353 (Pa.

1845).
55. Fergerson v. Staples, 82 Me. 159, 19 Ad. 158 (1889).
56. BRITTON, BILLS AND NoTEs 1022 (1943).
57. See note 23 supra and text.

58. Cf. Lawrenceburgh Nat. Bank v. Stevenson, 51 Ind. 594 (1875).

59. Merchants' Nat. Bank v. Spates, 41 W. Va. 27, 23 S. E. 681 (1895).

60. See cases cited note 25 sipra.
61. Gaines v. Fitzgibbons, 168 La. 260, 121 So. 763 (1929).
62. In some instances, parol evidence is admitted to determine the intent of the
parties where indorsement of a non-negotiable instrument is "without recourse."
Charnley v. Dulles, 8 W. & S. 353 (Pa. 1845); cf. NEGOTiABLE INSTRUMENTs LAW

§ 38.
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of a non-negotiable instrument. The courts have not indicated that the
liability of such an assignor is any different from that of an assignor of
a simple chose in action, merely stating that he makes the warranties of
an assignor. 63 This, of course, does not include those jurisdictions which
impose an indorser liability which they simply label "implied warranties
of an assignor." 64 The usual rule is that the assignor warrants that
the instrument is genuine and what it purports to be.65 Under this general
rule, an assignor has been held to warrant that the chose in action is not
usurious,66 that it is not a forgery, 67 and that it is legally binding on the
primary obligor. 68 Some courts speak of an implied warranty of solvency,
but the usual rule is that the assignor does not warrant solvency by the
mere act of assignment.6 9
Just as there appears to be no difference between the warranties of
an assignor of non-negotiable paper and those of an assignor of an ordinary chose in action, so it appears that there is no marked difference between them and the warranties of an assignor of a negotiable instrument,
although different language is sometimes used.70 Since the basis for implied warranties is the sale for value, and is common to negotiable and nonnegotiable choses alike, there seems to be no valid reason for making any
distinction. 71 There is, however, a difference as to whom the warranties
run. Generally, the warranties of an assignor run only to the immediate
assignee, unless specifically extended to subsequent assignees.72 Such was
the rule as to negotiable instruments at common law; 73 it remains the
law as to transfers of negotiable instruments by delivery. 74 But with regard to transfers by qualified indorsements, the Negotiable Instruments
Law has extended the warranties to all subsequent holders. 75 Although
this extension is justified as an aid to negotiability, the policy is by no
means restricted to the field of negotiable instruments. In the field of
sales law, also, the trend is to extend implied warranties to remote buyers.76 Once we have recognized that the circulation of non-negotiable
commercial paper should be facilitated in ways not inconsistent with its
character of non-negotiability, the conclusion is inescapable that implied
warranties should extend to remote transferees.
Under the Code.-With regard to the substance of the implied warranties of the transferor of non-negotiable paper, the Code, in effect, is a
codification of the common law. But in respect to whom the warranties
run, the Code makes a broad departure.77 Unlike the Negotiable Instruments Law, however, the Code does not use the common law language
63. Newer v. First Nat. Bank, 74 Mont. 549, 241 Pac. 613 (1925) (under statute

purporting to be a codification of the common law).
64. See note 27 supra and text.
65. Hayter v. Dinsmore, 125 Kan. 749, 265 Pac. 1112 (1928).
66. Tant v. Tant, 17 Gratt. 11 (Va. 1866).
67. Charnley v. Dulles, 8 W. & S. 353 (Pa. 1845).
68. Flynn v. Allen, 57 Pa. 482 (1868).
69. Giffert v. West, 33 Wis. 617 (1873); RESTATEMENT, CONTRAcrs § 175 (2)

(1932).

70. Hunt v. Sanders, 288 Mo. 337, 232 S. W. 456 (1921) ; Keller v. Hicks, 22 Cal.
457 (1863); cf. NEGOTIABLE INSTRUmENTS LAW §§ 65, 66; RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS
§ 175 (1932).
71. 3 WILLISToN, CoNTRACTS § 445 (rev. ed. 1936).
72. Weaver v. Beard & Bro., 21 Mo. 155 (1855).
73. Watson v. Chesire, 18 Iowa 202 (1865).
74. NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW § 65.
75. See BlrToN, BnLLS AND NOTES 1020 (1943).
76. VOLD, SALES 474 (1931).
77. CODE § 421.
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which caused so much difficulty in application. A favorite phrase of the
common law was that an assignor warrants that the instrument "is genuine
and what it purports to be." 78 The uncertainty of such a general standard
is avoided by specifically stating that the transferor warrants against
forgeries, material alterations, defective title, any defenses good against the
transferor, and knowledge of any insolvency proceeding against the
primary obligor.7 9 In providing that the warranties run to the transferee
or any subsequent holder in good faith the Code departs completely from
the existing cases on non-negotiable instruments, 0 and makes the law fit
business needs better thereby.8 '
INSTRUMENTS NOT COVEPED BY THE CODE

At Common Law.-The Code extends its provisions only to those
non-negotiable instruments which have all the formal requisites of negotiability except the words "to order" or "to bearer." 82 To that extent
it will tend to make uniform the law of non-negotiable paper. There ean
be little argument.against including such instruments in the Code, especially since they are often considered negotiable by the persons dealing
with them, and because the words of negotiability are often omitted inadvertently. 8 But no court has expressly limited indorser liability on
non-negotiable instruments to those whose only defect was omission of
words of negotiability. On the contrary, many courts have imposed indorser liability on instruments non-negotiable for other reasons. Thus,
some form or other of indorser liability has been imposed where the instrument was non-negotiable by reason of containing an acceleration clause,84
or a provision for payment of taxes,8 5 or where the instrument was under
seal.8 6 In most of these cases, the courts have not discussed the question of when a non-negotiable instrument' comes within the rules as to
indorser liability and when it is a simple contract subject to the law of
assignments.8 7 On the other hand, some courts have held that there is
indorser liability on non-negotiable paper only if it is in the form of a bill
or note.88 In such cases the inquiry has not been primarily as to the
negotiability of the instrument sued on, but whether the defect was so
serious as to disqualify the instrument as even a non-negotiable bill or
note. Accordingly, recovery against indorsers has been denied where
the promise was conditional,89 or not for a sum certain. 0 The effect of
such a view is to limit indorser liability to instruments non-negotiable for
lack of words of negotiability, since the other formal requisites of negotiability determine also whether the instrument is a bill or note.9 ' Even
78. See note 65 sup ra.
79. CODE § 421.

80. Ibid.; cf. note 72 supra.
81. See note 76 supra and text.

82. CODE § 805.
83. For general discussion, see Goodrich, Nonnegotiable Bills and Notes, 5 Iowa
L. BULL. 65 (1920).
84. Piascyk v. Malon, 116 Conn. 418, 165 Ad. 352 (1933).
85. Mazurldewicz v. Dowholonek, 111 Conn. 65, 149 At. 234 (1930).
86. Heifer v. Alden, Cutter & Hull, 3 Minn. 332 (1859).
87. See cases cited notes 84-86 supra.
88. Smith v. First State Bank, 95 Minn. 496, 104 N. W. 369 (1905).
89. First Nat. Bank v. Lamoreaux, 255 Ill. App. 15 (1929).
90. Smith v. First State Bank, 95 Minn. 496, 104 N. W. 369 (1905).
91. See definition of bills and notes in 1 DANIEL, NEGOTABLE INSTRUMENTS §§ 26,
27 (7th ed. 1933).
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do not expressly limit the liability to the extent that
these courts, however,
92
the Code does.
Neither of the prevailing approaches satisfactorily draws the line
between non-negotiable instruments with indorser liability and simple contracts subject to the law of assignments. Those courts which have applied the rule of indorser liability without discussion of where the line
should be cause much uncertainty; those which limit the rule to paper
in the form of bills or notes preclude indorser liability on some important
types of non-negotiable instruments, such as long form paper and nonnegotiable certificates of deposit.9 3 It has been suggested that the test
should be whether the instrument in question is a "mercantile instrument,"
whatever that may be.94 Ultimately, the question must turn on whether,
as a matter of business practice and need, the transfer of the type of
instrument under consideration should be facilitated, even though it lacks
complete negotiability. 95 Sometimes there is a strong business reason
for inserting a security provision that destroys negotiability. 96 Here the
parties trade negotiability, the primary element of which is the cutting off
of defenses upon transfer, for security. But it does not follow that the
parties necessarily give up all transferability, and the fact that such instruments are usually issued in such form that they would be negotiable
except for the offending provision, shows the business desire that they
be as transferable as possible. If indorser liability is denied, transferability is greatly hindered, especially
since the indorsee takes subject to
97
defenses of the primary obligor.
Effect of the Code.-The Code, as presently drafted, will by no means
completely clarify the liability of the transferor of non-negotiable paper.
It places some non-negotiable paper under the same rules as negotiable
paper, while other non-negotiable paper remains under the confused common law. In view of its purpose to make uniform the law concerning
all commercial paper, it seems essential that the Code include some further
provision with regard to instruments non-negotiable for reasons other than
lack of words of negotiability. 9 It is impossible to lay down a standard
which will once and for all determine what other instruments should come
within the Code. But that does not preclude a legislative mandate to
the courts that certain instruments which meet a general test be included.
In formulating such a test, it will be helpful to remember that in every
case where the courts have imposed indorser liability, the instrument
was similar in form to a negotiable instrument,99 and that in no case has
such liability been imposed where the obligation has not been to pay
money. 100 It might be provided that if an obligation to pay money is
embodied in an instrument whose form indicates that the parties dealing
therewith intended it to be freely transferable, and if such intention is
reflected in current business practice, it shall come within the Code even
though non-negotiable, except that there can be no holder in due course.
92.
93.
94.
95.
Chafee,

CODE § 805.
Patterson v. Poindexter, 6 W. & S. 227 (Pa. 1843).
Goodrich, Nonnegotiable Bills and Notes, 5 Iowa L. Bu. 65, 71 (1920).
For discussion of the policy of promoting circulation of negotiable paper see
Acceleration Provisionsin Time Paper, 32 HAgv. L. REv. 747, 750 (1919).

96. See note 3 spra.
97. Persky v. Bank of America Nat. Ass'n, 261 N. Y. 212, 185 N. E. 77 (1933).

98. For discussion of the general aims of the Code, see Gilmore, On the Difficulties of Codifying Commercial Law, 57 YALE L. J. 1341 (1948).
99. See notes 84-86 supra.

100. Gray v. Donahoe, 4 Watts 400 (Pa. 1835) (payable in current bank notes).
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Concededly, this leaves much to the courts, but it is not inconsistent with
the old and salutary practice of having the courts look to business practice to determine the law applicable to commercial paper. 1' 1
CONCLUSION

The Code takes a forward step toward clarification of the law of nonnegotiable paper by including within its purview instruments whose only
defect is the omission of words of negotiability. In applying to such nonnegotiable paper and to negotiable paper the same rule of indorser liability, the Code recognizes a policy of the common law, but is not strictly
a codification of common law rules. As to the warranties of a transferor
of non-negotiable paper, the Code comes much closer to a codification of
the common law, except that warranties are made to run to subsequent
holders. So far as it goes, the Code provision is desirable, but it should
be extended to cover many commercial instruments non-negotiable for
reasons other than lack of words of negotiability. Such application of the
same rules to negotiable and non-negotiable instruments does not erase
the principal distinction between them, since there can be no holder
in
10 2
due course of a non-negotiable instrument even under the Code.
-E. L. N.

Standard Jury Instructions
In recent years a considerable number of judges and lawyers have
criticized the traditional system of jury instruction.' The standard instruction has been lauded as a modern device for eliminating many of the
defects of the older practice. 2 This Note will describe its operation and
will evaluate its adequacy for the lay jury's needs.
Under the traditional system of instruction, the judge has to present
the factual issues to the jury in his own words.3 As a consequence, less
skilled judges have subjected the jury to a tangled complexity of verbiage,
101. See Cudahy Packing Co. v. State Nat. Bank, 134 Fed. 538, 542-43 (8th Cir.
1904).
102. In general, see Lewis, The ProposedNew Commercial Code, 20 Pa. B. A. Q.
131 (1949) ; Beers, New Steps Toward Uniformity-The Commercial Code, 20 CONN.
B. J.80 (1946).
1. Among the suggestions for improving jury instructions, in addition to the
standard instruction, have been the following: (a) Use of jury manuals-Bishop, Let
Us Really Inform Our Jurors, 20 CAt. STATE BAR J. 99 (1945); (b) Revision of
education of legal profession-Trusty, The Value of Clear Instructions, 15 KAN. CITY
L. REv. 9 (1947); (c) More specific framing of instructions-McCleary, Defense of
Sole Cause in the Mo. Negligence Cases, 10 Mo. L. REv. 1, 27-28 (1945) ; (d) Modified special verdicts-GREE, JUDGE & JURY 355 (1930) ; (e) Enlarging the power of
judge to comment on the evidence-A. B. A. REP., COMMITTEE ON JUDICIAL ADMIXISTRATION 53 (1946).
2. Caplan, Standardized Jury Instructions in, Illitwis, 7 JoHN MARSHALL L. Q.
313 (1942) ; Price, Standardized Jury Instructionsfor Illinois, 23 CHIC. BAR REc. 228
(1942).
3. James, Function of Judge and Jury in Negligence Cases, 58 YALE L. J. 667
(1949) ; Rossman, The Judge-Jury Relationship it the State Courts, 10 LAW Soc'y J.
349, 354 (1942). See also PRoFrAr, TRIAL BY JtmY § 311-350 (1877).
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much of which is neither usable nor understandable by laymen. 4 Again,
the discretion gven to the trial judge in formulating proper instructions
has led to inadvertent error because of careless inclusion of a wrong
word,5 or as the result of unconscious bias operating on the judge's choice
of words.6 Even in the absence of actual reversible error, it is difficult
to avoid prejudicing the jury slightly. Finally, counsel have often abused
the privilege of requesting instructions by choosing language designed
to befuddle the jury or deliberately to produce error.7
The standard instruction has attempted to remedy these defects by
limiting instructions to statements of legal principles. 8 Standard instructions cannot be couched in terms of the evidence, which varies necessarily
from case to case. Further, anything less than an exclusive use of standard
instructions would leave untouched the problems within the area of nonstandard instructions. The jury, therefore, is left to apply the9 rules of
law to the evidence with only the help of arguments of counsel.
California's Book of Standard Instruction, of which two volumes have
appeared so far, is typical. One volume deals with criminal prosecutions,' 0
and the other primarily with the common types of negligence actions."
The text is a careful product of experts, and sets forth legal principles, organized especially for use at trial, in simple language designed
for laymen's understanding. Similarly, provision is made for the use
12
of the same standard instructions by counsel in their requests for charge.
Obviously the adoption of uniform language from case to case will tend
to eliminate some of the defects in the present system.'1 In addition, time

4. E. g., Cummings v. Penna. Ry., 45 F. 2d 152 (2d Cir. 1930) ; Southern Bldg.
& Loan Ass'n v. Holmes, 227 Ala. 1, 149 So. 861 (1933) ; Johnson v. State, 99 Tex.
Crim. 25, 267 S. W. 713 (1925). See also A. B. A. REP., COmmITT ON JUDICIAL
AD I IsTRAToN 52 (1946) ; GRaze, op. cit. supra note 1, at 351. But compare The
Jury Looks at Trial by Jury, 31 J. AM. JuD. Soc'y 105, 107 (1947) (poll of jurors indicating satisfaction with traditional instructions). Judges sometimes use such equivocal terms intentionally in order to avoid the hazard of taking a position which
might lead to reversal. E. g., Citizens Trust & Guaranty Co. v. Ohio Valley Tie Co.,
138 Ky. 421, 128 S. W. 317 (1910) ; Gmms, op. cit. supra note 1, at 316.
5. E. g., Klaus v. Sheets, 333 II1. App. 151, 79 N. E. 2d 86 (1948) (use of "could"
instead of "would" in defining contributory negligence) ; Palmer, Standardized Jury
InstructionsSucceed, 23 J. AM. JUD. Soc'Y 177, 180 (1940). Reversal may be avoided
by application of the doctrine of prejudicial error. See Syms v. Horman, 134 Conn.
653, 657, 60 A. 2d 166. 167 (1948) ; De Stanis v. Lange, 137 N. J. L. 480, 483, 66
A. 2d 630, 633 (1948); Farley, Instructions to Juries-Their Role in the Judical
Process, 42 YALE L. J. 194, 210-214, 224 (1932) (discussion of means of avoiding
reversal, pointing out the tendency of appellate courts to encroach unduly upon the
functions of the trial court).
6. E. g., Sacramento Suburban Fruit Lands Co. v. Jenson, 36 F. 2d 936 (9th Cir.
1929) ; Gaskins v. Kelly, 228 N. C. 697, 704, 47 S. E. 2d 34, 38 (1948).
7. It has been contended that requests for instructions may be worded trickily
so as to make their refusal a ground for procurement of a new trial in the event of an
adverse verdict. Farley, supra note 5, at 214-216.
8. CALIFORNIA JURY INSTRUCTIONS CIVIL (hereinafter cited as BAjI) xxix

(1943).

9. BAjI xxix; CALIFORNIA
CALiIc) xxxvi (1946).
10. CAIJIC.

JURY INSTRUCTIONS

CRIMINAL

(hereinafter cited

as

11. BAji. Other jurisdictions using some form of standard instruction include the
following: Nebraska-Nos. 1-56 appearing in Bar Ass'n Section, 24 NEB. L. REv. 196
(1945), and Nos. 57-74 in Bar Ass'n Section, 25 NEB. L. Rzv. 638 (1946) ; Florida-in
20 FLA. B. A. J. 60 (1946) ; Municipal Court of Chicago-published as a form -book
in a limited edition not available for general use.
12. Counsel obtain the applicable instructions on printed forms from the clerk of
court, and submit them in appropriate combination to the trial judge. Slight deviations to meet differences in fact are, however, countenanced. BAJI xxxii.
13. Forewords, CALJIc and BAJI; and generally Caplan, supra note 2; Price,
supra note 2; Palmer, supra note 5.
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and effort will be saved for the trial lawyer as well as the judge. The
value of a treatise of legal principles designed for use in the trial court is
indisputable.1 4 Nevertheless, the standard instruction introduces new
problems which require closer examination.
NONcONCRETENESS:

A

SERIOUS WEAKNESS

The jury instruction is the basic means by which the court informs
the jury of its duties. Since the jury is the fact finding body, the court
must explain to it the factual issues and the legal consquences flowing
from the resolution of these issues. Under the traditional system, the
court accomplishes this by summarizing the evidence on each side of the
issue, and by explaining the bearing of each finding of fact on the disposition of the case. 15
The standard instruction assumes that the jury needs neither explanation of the factual issues nor summary of the evidence. A detailed
statement of the relevant legal principles is deemed sufficient to enable the
jury to find its own way. This hypothesis is extremely doubtful. Rules
of law are, of course, sufficient for many jury purposes. It is proper, for
example, to tell the jury that they are the trier of facts and that the judge
decides the law; 16 or that they must consider the evidence without regard
to sympathy, prejudice, or passion for or against either party.' 7 Similarly,
they may be told in the form of a legal principle how they must treat a
cross claim,' 8 or a case involving joint liability.' 9 Many situations, however, cannot be explained to a jury in terms of principles of law, no
matter how detailed the latter are made. Four illustrations are offered
here:
I. Two cars are travelling in opposite directions toward an intersection. A attempts a-left hand turn and is struck by B just before completing the turn. An action brought by A for negligence is opposed by
a counterclaim from B who similarly alleges negligence. Evidence is
introduced that A, in making the turn, failed to give the proper hand signal. One of the issues facing the jury is, therefore,
whether or not such
20
failure was a proximate cause of the accident.
The relevant California standard instructions defining proximate
causation are as follows:
"The proximate cause of an injury is the cause which in natural
and continuous sequence unbroken by any efficient and intervening
cause produces the injury and without which the result would not
have occurred. It is the efficient cause-the one which necessarily
21
sets in operation the factor which accomplishes the injury.
14. Model books of instructions are not new. AsTy, A GENERAL CHARGE To ALL
GRAND JURIES AND OTHER JURIES (1725) appears to be one of the earliest. RANDALL,
INSTRUCTIONS TO JURIES (1922) is typical of what is presently available for use. It

has also been a common practice for judges to record in private form books the general instructions which they use recurrently.
15. PRO ATT, op. cit. supra note 3, § 311; McCleary, supra note 1, at 27-28.
16. E.g., BAjI 1; Florida Standard Instructions No. 1.
17. E. g., BAJI 4; CALJIc 1.

18. E. g., BAJI 51.
19. E.g., BAJI 54.
20. This illustration is taken directly from the illustrations in BAJI xxxvii, designed to explain the use of the standard instruction.
21. BAJI 104; cf. Nebraska Standard' Instructions Nos. 50 and 60.
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"This does not mean that the law meets and recognizes only one
proximate cause of an injury consisting of only one factor, one act,
one element of circumstances for the conduct of only one person.
To the contrary, the acts or omissions of two or more persons may
work concurrently as efficient cause of an injury and in such a case
each of the participating acts or omissions is regarded in law as a
proximate cause." 22
Can such an instruction really aid the jury to determine, from the
conflicting viewpoints of the accident, whether or not to consider the
failure to give the hand signal as the proximate cause of the injury?
Lawyers have argued for generations over the meaning of "natural and
continuous sequence" and "efficient cause." 23 Present methods of instruction might not be completely adequate, but they would segregate
more sharply what the jury must determine and what the judge himself
will decide. The phrasing of the rule of proximate cause in terms of the
evidence would make more sense to the jury. They might be told, for
example, that they must find that there was a failure to give a hand
signal, and that the accident would not have occurred if such signal were
given. They would then be charged that even if they found that B was
also careless, A would not be relieved of responsibility for failure to give
the signal, unless the accident would have occurred in any event.
II. A printer is tried for criminal conspiracy, with evidence tending
to show that he had printed tickets for a group engaged in conducting a
"baseball pool." 24 The California Criminal Charges which appear to be
relevant are as follows:
"The law defines conspiracy to be an agreement or understanding between two or more persons that they will commit an unlawful
act, that is, that they will combine together to accomplish by united
action a criminal or unlawful purpose, or a purpose, which is not in
itself criminal or unlawful, by criminal or unlawful means, to accomplish which agreement in furtherance thereof an overt act is
committed by one or more of the parties to the agreement. In other
words, conspiracy is a criminal partnership, the object of which is
to do an unlawful act or a series of unlawful acts, or to do a lawful
act or a series of lawful acts by unlawful means, accompanied by an
overt act to effect the object of such agreement." 25
"It is not necessary in proving a conspiracy to show a meeting
of the alleged conspirators or the making of an express or formal
agreement. The formation and existence of a conspiracy may be
inferred from all the circumstances tending to show the common intent and may be proved in the same way as any other fact may be
proved, either by direct testimony of the fact or by circumstantial
evidence, or by both direct and circumstantial evidence." 26
Does such a instruction properly distinguish between the function of
court and jury? It leaves it to the jury to say what constitutes an "un22.

BAJI 104A.
PROSSER, TORTS

311-320 (1941) (containing discussion of and proposed soluthe substantive problem).
Cf. Commonwealth v. Mittleman, 154 Pa. Super. 572, 36 A. 2d 860 (1944).
CALjIc 931.
26. CALjic 934 (offering also alternate instruction).

23.
tion for
24.
25.
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lawful purpose" and "unlawful means" as well as what is an "overt act." 27
Of course the statutory definition of a lottery might have been added.
Further, the jury is not told what circumstances tend to show "the common intent" to conspire. They would have been better informed, even
without being told as fully what a conspiracy is, if the charge stated that
the sale of these tickets constituted an unlawful lottery, and that in order
to find the defendant guilty they would have to find him a party to an
agreement the design of which was to distribute these tickets against the
law. Finally they might be told that they should consider his knowledge
of what the tickets were used for, and his act in printing them, as circumstantial evidence going to the issue of whether he had been a party to such
an agreement.
Ill. A is indicted for conspiracy to assault union employees of his
employer in a case where the fact of the assault had been proven.2 8 In
addition to the instructions in the preceding illustration, the jury might
be asked to consider the following:
"The formation and existence of a criminal conspiracy belong
to a class of facts which seldom can be established by direct evidence.
In the very nature of the case such common design rarely can be
shown by direct evidence, and often can be shown only by circumstantial evidence. A finding of the formation and the existence of a
conspiracy may stand on circumstantial evidence alone, if from all
the evidence the jury is convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of the
existence of such facts. In determining the question whether or not
an alleged conspiracy was formed and existed, it is proper to take
into consideration the relation of the accused parties to one another,
if the evidence shows any connection between them, their personal
and business associations with each other, if any, and any and all
facts in evidence which may tend to show what, if anything, occurred
between them, at or before the time of the alleged combination or
agreement, or which tend to show what, if anything, occured between
them, or any of them, thereafter in relation thereto, as well as evidence of any acts performed and declarations made by any of said
parties subsequent to the formation of such alleged combination or
agreement in respect to, and in pursuance and furtherance of, the
alleged conspiracy. From such facts and circumstances as shown by
the evidence you will determine whether or not a criminal combination or agreement did in fact exist as charged in the case, and if it
did exist, which, if any, of the defendants were parties to such conspiracy." 29
Much of this instruction would be of little help to a jury. Phrases
like "relation of the accused parties to one another" have little meaning
27. CALJIc 938 defines overt act as "any step or act by anyone of the conspiracy

which goes beyond mere planning, agreement and intent toward the accomplishment
of the object of the conspiracy, and which is done to effect that object.
"Such an act need not, in and of itself, constitute the crime or even an immediate
attempt to consummate the crime . . . nor need it be, in and of itself, a criminal or an

unlawful act."
This language is so broad that it appears to offer little positive help to the jury.
The substantive problem is nonexistent in Pennsylvania where no overt act is neces-

sary to constitute a conspiracy beyond that of the agreement itself. Commonwealth v.
Richardson, 229 Pa. 609, 79 At. 222 (1911).
28. Cf. People v. Borrelli, 392 Ill. 481, 64 N. E. 2d 719 (1946).
29. CALJiC 933.
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apart from evidence to which they might be referred. The jury would
be better informed if they were told, for example, that they were to consider the extent to which the defendant was taken into his employer's
confidence in connection with labor relations, as well as any evidence of
special friendship or trust between the two, as factors tending to indicate
that such an agreement existed. Further, the use of the more general
instructions defining conspiracy would be purposeless in this case, since
the existence of an agreement is the only issue for the jury. Their use
might be encouraged by their ready availability, and could easily divert
the jury's attention from what it must'decide.
IV. A Nebraska standard instruction states the rule concerning the
effect of frolic as opposed to detour, on the master's liability, where there
is undisputed evidence that a servant who had been directed to drive a
car to his master's garage has negligently injured someone.30 In substance, it provides that the servant must have been within the scope of his
employment at the time of the injury, and that the employer will not be
relieved of liability if the servant's negligence occurred while making a
"slight deviation" from the direct route of destination, but will be relieved
if the negligence occurred while there was such a "substantial deviation
or departure as to amount for the time being to an abandonment of the
employer's business."
The instruction is probably a fair statement of the rule of law. Yet
suppose the driver went three blocks out of his way to buy a paper out
of a total trip of six blocks? 31 Suppose he went three blocks to his home
to bed for the night, thinking that he would return the car in the morning? 32 How can the jury determine whether the deviation is "slight" or
"substantial"? A general statement emphasizing the importance of considering the relation of distance and time of the entire trip to that of the
deviation or departure would help. Nevertheless, the jury would be in a
more intelligent position if the relationship were graphically demonstrated
in terms of the precise evidence they must consider, rather than in terms
of an abstract rule.
The Pennsylvania point of view is displayed in a recent case.33 There
the defendant, blinded by the lights of an approaching car, drove off the
road on to a shoulder, and overturned while trying t6 regain the road and
to reduce speed simultaneously. Action was brought against him for the
death of a guest passenger. In the trial court, the jury was charged to
consider. "the handling of the car," to determine whether or not the defendant was negligent. This instruction was held reversible error, on the
ground that it was so general as to be misleading, even though abstractly
correct. The court pointed out that the jury should have been told
specifically that the defendant might have been negligent after leaving the
road,3 e.
g., by failing to slow down promply, even if blameless prior to that
4
time.
The jury cannot decide difficult factual issues without the assistance
of professionals in formulating these issues.3 5 Proponents of standard
30. Nebraska Standard Instruction No. 12; cf. BAjI 54D.
31. Cf. Loomis v. Hollister, 75 Conn. 718, 55 Atl. 561 (1903) ; Riley v. Standard
Oil Co., 231 N. Y. 301, 132 N. E. 97 (1921).
32. Cf. Wilson & Co. v. Shaw, 157 Okla. 34, 10 P. 2d 448 (1932).
33. Randolph v. Campbell, 360 Pa. 453, 62 A. 2d 60 (1948) ; cf. Western Ky.
Coal Co. v. Davis, 138 Ky. 667, 128 S. W. 1074 (1910).
34. Randolph v. Campbell, supra note 33, at 456, 62 A. 2d at 62.
35. Trusty, supranote 1, at 11, advocates further education for the legal profession
particularly along these lines.
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instructions contend that this objection is adequately met by counsel's
arguments to the jury.36 The evidence, they say, will be fitted into the
legal principles composing the instructions by both sides, and the jury
can choose intelligently between the two sides. Their position is
stengthened by the fact that, with standard instructions, lawyers know
to a large extent what the charge will contain and can prepare their
arguments accordingly.
There is likely to be disagreement, however as to the nature of the
factual issues to which the legal principles are to be applied. Counsel will
generally attempt to present the evidence in terms of their own theory
of the case so as to minimize the relevancy of the evidence which favors
the opposing side. The jury will be forced to depend for guidance upon
two totally dissimilar theories of opposing interested parties. If, for example, a pedestrian is struck from behind while crossing a street, the jury's
function in sifting the evidence would not be to determine whether or
37
not he is to be charged with the absolute duty of looking behind him.
The same motivations exist which have led td abuses in the traditional
method where lawyers request instructions. 88 These evils would be magnified through the loss of the judicial power to exclude.3 9
Finally, the standard instructions add an element of sterility to the
law. It is common knowledge that, under the stimulus of changing conditions, important legal principles have evolved at the trial court level.
40
Both judges, and counsel as well, have contributed to the progress.
Existing rules, applied to new situations, have been given novel twists
which, in time, are recognized as modifications of the general rules. At
some point, as the process continues, old theories are discarded and new
ones accepted. The habit of standard instructions may have a tendency
to stunt this growth by encouraging the use of pigeon-holes. It will require able judges and lawyers to discriminate between situations for
which the instructions were designed and the novel situation which demands individualized treatment. Under the traditional system, there is
less pressure to conform instructions to well worn grooves.
CONCLUSION

The standard jury instruction is too untried for a determination of
its value from actual experience. 41 Examination of the contents of the
instructions indicates, however, that jurors will not be so well informed
of what they must decide as under the traditional system. The evils of
jury instruction need more basic remedies. In large part, they may be
due to insufficiently trained personnel. 42 While it is true that standard
instructions will prevent faulty wording of legal principles, they cannot
36. BAJI xxix; CALJIc xl.
37. Cf. Johnson v. Griepenstroh, 150 Neb. 126, 132, 33 N. W. 2d 549, 553 (1948).
BAji 201C appears too general to guide a jury through this pitfall.
38. See note 7 supra.
39. E. g., In re Schofield, 362 Pa. 201, 216-217, 66 A. 2d 675, 677-679 (1949).
40. Rothschild, Men and Law, 1 BROOKLYN L. Rv. 1 (1932).
41. Both Reed v. Stroh. 54 Cal. App. 2d 183. 188, 128 P. 2d 829, 832 (2d Dist.
1942), and Temple v. DeMirjian, 51 Cal. App. 2d 559, 566, 125 P. 2d 544, 548 (2d Dist.
1942), indicate early enthusiasm on the part of the appellate court judiciary for the
new system. More recently, Judge Bishop, one of the judges of the court which first
adopted standard instructions, has published the article cited supra note 1, indicating
that some judges are no longer satisfied with it.
42. Stone, Instructions to Juries: A Survey of the General Field,26 WASH. U. L.
Q. 455 (1941).
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relieve the judge from the ultimate responsibility of deciding which principles are applicable. 43 Yet it appears that this is one of the greatest
single causes of reversible error in the charge.44 The rules of law themselves are sometimes so unrealistic that little can be said for them except
that they provide a facade behind which the jury dispenses rough justice while the legal framework itself retains the appearance of logical
certainty. 45 Finally, rules of law occasionally so conflict with the mores
of the times, that the jury deliberately refuses to follow them. 48 Toward
these rules and the men who state them in the instructions efforts for
reform must primarily be directed.
L.L.

Criminal Sanctions Protecting the Credit Seller
The United States has so far emerged into a credit economy that
some writers have said that money is now merely a substitute for credit.'
Credit arises when the ownership of wealth is divorced from the necessity
for its use. Fundamentally, it comes into being when a person obtains
the use of money or goods in exchange for a promise to make payment in
the future. It consists of both tangible and intangible elements. The
former is represented by the property of the seeker of credit, fortified by
confidence that he will preserve that property either in its original or
equivalent form to serve as a practical basis of his ability to redeem the
obligation incurred. The intangible element is the buyer's good faith
and the feeling of certainty that he will have the ability to make the assertion of his power over future events come true.2 Basically, the transfer
of goods and services for a mere promise to pay is nothing more than the
cQnfidence we have in expected behavior bf citizens, legislators and
judges.3 The importance of jealously protecting this confidence cannot
be overemphasized. Toward this end, the criminal law has long been
used to supplement civil relief to preserve and protect private property.
However, as business transactions have become more complex, particularly
in the credit field, the concept of split ownership of property has made the
problem of protecting divided, and often conflicting, property interests a
troublesome one. The difficulty lies not only in determining which party
has the protected right but also in preserving the dichotomy between4
honest misfortune and fraudulent misconduct in commercial transactions.
It is the purpose of this Note to explore the steps the several states have
taken by utilizing criminal sanctions to protect the seller of goods on credit.8
Considerable attention has been paid to the Pennsylvania law.
43. BAji xxx; CALjIC xli.

44. A limited survey of recent cases made by the writer indicates that a substantial number of reversible errors were the result of faulty application of law to the
facts. Standard instructions would not remove this source of error.
45. FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND C. XVI (1930).
46. Stone, supra note 42, at 455-458.
1. PRENDERGAST AND STEINER, CREDIT AND ITS UsEs 3 (1931).
2. WILLIS AND EDWARDS, BANKING AND BusiNEss 511 (rev. ed. 1925).
3. See CommONS, LEGAL FOUNDATIONS OF CAPITALISM 245 (1924).
4. HALL, THEFT, LAW AND SocmT 33 (1935).
5. The scope of this Note is limited to state legislation and excludes crimes under
federal statutes, including the Bankruptcy Acts. However, see note 80 infra and text
for mention of the fraudulent bankruptcy problem.
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NOTES
HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT

As the commercial revolution took place, the criminal law became
conscious of its obligation to keep abreast of large-scale changes in the
economic structure. This was due to a shifting of emphasis from an
agricultural economy to an industrial structure which incorporated into
its framework largely movables. 6 The basic penal sanction used to protect the ownership of property was larceny. But as the structure became
more complex, the traditional concepts, steeped with the requirements of
"caption" and "asportation," became less adequate. Common law larceny
protected only the possessor of goods from a wrongful trespass. It was
not until 1780 in Pear's Case,7 that the larceny concept was extended to
those cases in which possession was obtained by fraud. But where title
to the goods passed, even if obtained by fraud, the common law was of
little avail. Similarly, the crime of getting property by false token was
extremely limited. The means used had to be such as to affect the public at large and not merely a single individual. 8 The offense was gradually
broadened by statute, until, in 1757, obtaining property by false pretenses
was outlawed. 9
The increasing inequality in the distribution of property led to a
corresponding need to leave property in the hands of servants and other
persons. The common law had enlarged the concept of possession in
1529 so that if a servant converted property received directly from his
master he was guilty of larceny. But the servant or agent committed no
offense if he received money for his master's account from a third person
and converted it to his own use.' 0 To correct this anomaly, the statutory
crime of embezzlement was conceived in 1799." Meanwhile, the bailee
enjoyed a peculiar position of freedom. Although Carrier's Case had
been decided in 1473,12 the decision was limited to the situation where the
bailee "broke bulk." It was not until 1857 that a statute creating the
crime of larceny by bailee was enacted.' 3
Statutory ramifications have broadened these traditional concepts in
certain fields. For example, the element of agency relationship in the embezzlement statutes has been extended to include that of trustee, banker,
public official and many others.' 4 The so-called fraudulent conversion
statute made it a crime for one to convert the goods of another held in
any capacity or the proceeds derived from the sale thereof.15 These were
the tools long accepted in this country for the protection of property.
As the expansion of mercantile and banking credit continued, however, it
became necessary to safeguard the merchant who extended credit. Before
surveying the criminal sanctions which have been adopted for the protection of the credit seller, it may be helpful to look at the limitations,
6. MANNHEI,
CRIMINAL JUSTICE AND SOCIAL RECONSTRUCTION 86 (1946).
7. 1 Leach 211, 168 Eng. Rep. 208 (K. B. 1780). See HALL, op. cit. supra note 4,
at 11.
8. KENNY, OUTLINES OF CRIMINAL LAW 227 (Am. ed. 1907) ; HALL, op. cit. supra
note 4, at 11, 16.
9. 30 GEo. II, c. 24 (1757).
10. King v. Bazeley, 2 Leach 973, 168 Eng. Rep. 517 (K. B. 1799).
11. 39 GEo. III, c. 85 (1799). This was the first general embezzlement statute,
although it had been made criminal to embezzle from specific principals, e. q., The
Bank of England, The South Sea Co., etc. See HALL, op. cit. supra note 4, at 9.
12. Y. B. Pasch. 13 Edw. IV, f. 9, pl. 5 (1473). HALL, op. cit supra note 4, at
315.
13. 20 & 21 VICr., c. 54 (1857), superseded by 24 & 25 VicT., c. 96, § 3 (1861).
14. E. g., ILL. ANN. STAT., tit. 38, §§ 216, 209, 214, 208 (Smith-Hurd, 1935).
15. E. g., PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 18, § 4834 (Purdon, 1945).
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articulate and inarticulate, which govern the extent to which they may be
utilized.
LImITATIONS ON CRIMINAL SANCTIONS

Imprisonment for Debt.-The most serious and far-reaching limitation on imposing criminal sanctions to protect creditors is a fear of reverting to the use of imprisonment for debt. Until 1830 the practice
was widely used in both England and the United States.'0 In the Middle Atlantic states during that period, three to five times as many persons were imprisoned for debt as for crime, and most of the sums involved were very small. Starting in 1830, a wave of reform swept the
country, in the form of state statutes or constitutional amendments abolishing imprisonment for debt except in enumerated situations. Today thirtynine states have such a constitutional provision, the usual type forbidding
the practice except in cases of fraud. 17 With this exception, the limitation is considerably less formidable, since so long as the element of fraud
exists there is no prohibition against making such conduct a criminal
offense.' 8 The constitutional provisions were intended to prevent resort
to imprisonment for the collection of contract debts, and not to prevent
the state from imposing a criminal sanction where the public interest
justifies declaring certain conduct to be a crime. 19 Clearly then, it is
proper to denounce fraud in the inception of a contract or debt, since
fraud is a distinct injury to the state. In this vein, enactments have been
upheld which make it criminal to obtain accommodation at an inn with
intent to defraud, 20 and to receive deposits in a bank knowing of its insolvency. 2 1 As yet, however, no law has been passed, or statute construed,
to make it criminal for a merchant to continue to accept credit when he
is factually insolvent.22
The bad check laws 23 have been attacked as contrary to the constitutional prohibition. They have been upheld generally even where they do
not require that property actually be obtained by the use of the worthless
instrument.24 One enactment which made the giving of a post-dated
check without sufficient funds a criminal offense, has been held unconstitutional as imprisonment for debt. 25 A Georgia court has declared that,
unless the intent to defraud was an indispensable element, the statute would
be invalid as an instrument for the collection of debt by process of the
criminal law, in 2contravention of sound public policy and of the constitutional provision. 6
On the other hand, some statutes have flown in the face of the prohibition with continued success. Illustrative of these are the enactments which
deal with employers who obtain personal services by a false promise of
16. See Ford, Imprisonment for Debt, 25 MIcH. L. REv. 24 (1926) ; Comment, 37
L. J. 509 (1928).
17. The several states' constitutional provisions are listed in Note, 41 HARV. L.
REv. 786 (1928).
18. E. g., Freeman v. United States, 217 U. S. 539 (1910).
19. Comment, 37 YALE L. J. 509, 513 (1928).
20. See text at note 50 infra.
21. E. g., State v. Willis, 130 Tenn. 403, 170 S. W. 1030 (1914). For a complete
discussion see Comment, 43 YALE L. J. 1304 (1934).
YALE

22. MICHAEL AND WECHSLER, CRI MINAL LAW AND ITS ADmINISTRATION 474

(1940).
23. See text at note 53 infra.
24. Hollis v. State, 153 Ga. 182, 108 S. E. 783 (1921) ; State v. Avery, 111 Kan.
588, 207 Pac. 838 (1922) ; State v. Pilling, 53 Wash. 464, 102 Pac. 230 (1909).
25. State v. Nelson, 58 S. D. 562, 237 N. W. 766 (1931).
26. Neidlinger v. State, 17 Ga. App. 811, 88 S. E. 687 (1916).
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compensation. 27 Most statutes do include as an element the intent to defraud, to circumvent the prohibition in the typical state constitution. Such
statutes have been held invalid where they purported to punish fraud
irrebuttably presumed from the breach of the contract.2 8 But where the
essence of the statutory offense is fraud, the right to punish the employer
seems clear.29 A recent California decision upheld an enactment which
makes it criminal for any employer, having the ability to pay, wilfully to
refuse to pay wages when due.30 The statute did not require fraudulent
intent; nevertheless, the court found fraud from circumstances surrounding the non-payment rather than in the transaction from which the obligation grew.
As to mechanics liens, some states have put teeth in their civil provisions by declaring that the contractor's use of funds paid to him by the
owner under a contract to build or make other improvements on realty,
for any purpose other than the payment of laborers or materialmen, constitutes embezzlement. 3 ' In New York,
such action by the contractor or
32
a sub-contractor constitutes larceny.
Freedom of Trade.-Running alongside this limitation is an undefined
reluctance of the courts to impose criminal sanctions in the realm of commercial transactions. Fundamentally, there is the fear that the threat of
criminal prosection might be employed to exert pressure in an ordinary
contract dispute. 33 Perhaps more justified is the desire not to impede
commercial progress and to preserve the verve of the market place.3 4 The
same disposition not to cramp the style of trade, buttressed by the historical concepts of laissez-faire and caveat emptor, inhibited the evolution
of the law of fraud.3 5 In the eighteenth century, when A got money from
B by pretending to be sent as C's agent, Lord Holt grimly said, "Shall
we indict one man for making a fool of another ?" and bade the prosecutor
have recourse to civil action.3 6 While today the courts are more willing
to draw the line between an arm's length business transaction and commercial fraud, the shackles of tradition remain a restricting factor on the
use of the criminal sanction in this field.
27. E. g., Md. Laws 1939, c. 384.
28. Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U. S. 219 (1911).
29. E. g., Lamar v. State, 120 Ga. 312, 47 S. E. 958 (1904).
30. Ex parte Trombley, 31 Cal. 2d 801, 193 P. 2d 734 (1948), 97 U. OF PA. L. RZv.
281 (1948).
31. See Note, 41 HARv. L. REv. 786, 787 (1928). The authorities are at variance
as to the constitutionality of such enactments. State v. Harris, 134 Minn. 35, 158
N. W. 829 (1916) (sustained) ; People v. Holder, 53 Cal. App. 45, 199 Pac. 832 (2d
Dist. 1921) (invalid); Cf. IND. STAT. ANN., § 10-2112 (Bums, 1942).
32. N. Y. LIEN LAW §§ 36-a, 36-b.
33. E. g., Chaplin v. United States, 157 F. 2d 697 (D. C. Cir. 1946) ; Commonwealth v. Weiner, 340 Pa. 369, 17 A. 2d 357 (1941); Commonwealth v. Mitchneck,
130 Pa. Super. 433, 198 Atl. 463 (1938) ; Commonwealth v. Bixler, 79 Pa. Super. 295
(1922). See 34 HARV. L. REv. 557 (1921).
34. See Orfield, Criminal Misrepresentation: Obtaining by False Pretenses, 14
NEB. L. BULL. 129, 139 (1935) ; Comment, 21 TuLAxM L. REv. 639, 642 (1947).
35. HAMILTON,

ANCIENT

MAXIM

CAvEAT

EmPTiO,

40 YALE L.

J.

1133, 1184

(1931) ; HALL, op. cit. supra note 4, at 33; MANNHEIM, op. cit. supra note 6, at 120.
36. See MANNHEIM, op. cit. supra note 6, at 121. Compare Lord Mansfield's
famous dictum that a person who is fooled by his own credulity should be "left to
civil action." Rex v. Wheatley, 2 Burr. 1125, 1127, 97 Eng. Rep. 746, 748 (K. B.
1761). Such statements led a contemporary, Jonathan Swift, to remind his countrymen, "they (the Lilliputians) look upon fraud as a greater crime than theft, and therefore seldom fail to punish it with death; for they allege that care . . . may preserve
a man's goods from theft, but honesty has no defense against superior cunning." GULLIVER'S TRAVELS, c. VI.
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Popular Sentimen.-Another limitation is the unwillingness on the
part of the credit seller himself to take steps to utilize the existing penal
law. Not only does he realize that he may lose good will but he stands
to gain little from having a delinquent languish in prison. This natural
reluctance is given impetus by the striking success of malicious prosecution suits in which court and jury have thought that prosecution was instituted merely to collect a debt and not for the benefit of society.3 7 Of
paramount importance is the effect of public sympathy. In the public eye,
creditors are grasping; finance companies are cruel and wicked; bankers
stand little higher, despite their dignity. If public sentiment favors the
debtor class, it will have its effect on legislatures and courts, as well as
juries. While such reflection of public opinion may be desirable, it may
also create a tendency to lose sight of the fundamental distinction between
the honest debtor and the dishonest swindler. Perhaps even more important is the effect public opinion will have, not in inhibiting enforcement
of the law, but in stultifying its object. If the convicted man gains widespread public sympathy, sanctions will have little deterring effect.
INDUCING CREDIT BY FALSE PRETENSES

The first protection afforded the seller under existing penal law is
at the pre-sale stage, where the buyer induces the seller to extend credit
by a false pretense. In an impersonal economy, credit will only be extended
after analysis of the worth of those who seek it. Both the tangible and
intangible elements of credit must be carefully scrutinized in order that the
seller or his financer may be able to evaluate the buyer as a credit risk.
Several types of fraud are common in this connection.
False Financial Statements.-The financial statement offers the dishonest business man opportunity to misrepresent the tangible element of
credit. This is because of the great reliance placed upon the capital factor
by many credit men, and because of the difficulty of detecting falsity in a
financial statement.38 Yet the crime of false .pretenses includes within its
penumbra only situations where the falsifier obtains property from the
deceived. 39 The majority of the commercial states, at the instance of the
National Association of Credit Men, have adopted special statutes which
make it criminal to make a statement, either personally or through a credit
agency, which is materially false, for the purpose of securing credit and
with an intent that it be relied on.40 Thus, under a fair construction of
the statutes, blocks are imposed at the pre-loss stage, and the vaporous
"intent to defraud" is no longer required; nor is it necessary that any
benefit be received. 41 A few states
have reached the same result by use
42
of their false pretense statutes.
37. E. g., Cooper v. Schirrmeister, 176 Misc. 474, 26 N. Y. S. 2d 668 (N. Y. City
Ct. 1941); Winans v. Congress Hotel Co.. 227 Ill. AD. 276 (1st Dist. 1922); cf.
Payne v. East Liberty Spear Co., 323 Pa. 100, 185 At. 853 (1936). But cf. Andrews
v. Hotel Sherman, 138 F. 2d 524 (7th Cir. 1943).

38.

CHAPIN, CREDIT AND COLLECTION PRINIPCLES AND PRACTICE 253 (1929).

39. FIXEL, FALSE FINANCIAL STATEMENTS 156 (1924).
40. The New York statute is typical, N. Y. PENAL LAw § 1293-b. See CREDIT
MANUAL OF COMMERCIAL LAWS 353 (Nat. Ass'n of Credit Men, 1948); cf. People
v. Berkenfield, 191 Ill. 272, 61 N. E. 96 (1901) (no property need actually be obtained). In California the penalty is greater if property or credit is actually obtained.
People v. Breyer, 139 Cal. App. 547, 34 P. 2d 1065 (2d Dist. 1934).
41. MICHAEL AND WECHSLER, op. cit. supra note 22, at 473.
42. State v. Ball, 114 Miss. 505. 75 So. 373 (1917). In general, prior to these
statutes it was not an offense for one to make a written representation as to another's
financial ability. People v. Feinman, 77 Misc. 408, 137 N. Y. Supp. 933 (N. Y. City
Ct. 1912).
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Obtaining Credit Through False Representations.-Closely allied to
the false financial statement law are the statutes which declare it unlawful
to make knowingly a false statement in writing representing financial condition or ability to pay and upon reliance thereof to obtain credit.43 These
statutes require that the pretense must be in writing and signed by the
party to be charged. This rule was dictated by the knowledge that "criminal
charges of false pretenses are often instituted in reality to compel payment
of a debt, and easily fabricated." 44
New York has specifically enacted a statutory provision which makes
an oral representation as described above not a criminal offense. 45 Nevertheless, where the accused orally affirmed the truth of a false statement of
his financial status, even though made by another, conviction was upheld.4 6
An identical result can be reached under one of the provisions of the typical
false financial statement statute.4 7 New York has also adopted a unique
statute which requires that, where a buyer who purchases goods on the
basis of a financial statement does not pay, the seller may within ninety
days after default request the right to examine the buyer's books. The
latter must allow this, and refusal to do so is presumptive evidence that
the statement was false and so known to the buyer. 48 This statute has
to support a conviction in conbeen held constitutional, and has been used
49
junction with a false financial statement.
Protection of Certain Classes of Creditors.-Almost every state has
adopted statutes which protect certain favored classes of persons from
whom property was obtained by credit. The most widely adopted enactment of this type is the statute which provides that any person who obtains food, lodging, or other accommodation without paying therefor, with
intent to defraud the inn-keeper, or obtains credit by means of a false
pretense, is guilty of an offense.50 Most states also provide that, if credit
was obtained by a showing of baggage, any subsequent removal thereof
without payment shall be presumptive evidence of an intent to defraud. 1
The protection 5of
2 wage earners and mechanics lienholders has already been
outlined above.
43. E. .q., PA. STAT. ANN., tit: 18, § 4838 (Purdon, 1945) ; People v. Lucas, 75
Il. App. 662 (3d Dist. 1898) (purpose of the statute). A few states have adopted
this law in lieu of the false financial statement statute. E. g., CoLo. STAT. ANN., c.
48, §316 (1936). California provides that if credit is actually obtained, the offense
is larceny; otherwise, it is merely a misdemeanor. CAL. PENAL CoDE §§ 532, 532a
(Deering, 1941) ; accord, Morris v. People, 4 Colo. App. 136, 35 Pac. 188 (1893)
(insisting that value be actually obtained).

44. People v. Hyatt, 172 N. Y. 176, 65 N. E. 825 (1902).
45. N. Y. PENAL LAW § 947.

46. People v. Levin, 119 App. Div. 233, 104 N. Y. Supp. 647 (1907), aff'd per
cur., 194 N. Y. 554, 87 N. E. 1124 (1909).
47. The N. Y. statute so provides, see note 40 siepra; see also PA. STAT. ANN.,

tit. 18, § 4839 (Purdon, 1945).
48. N. Y. PENAL LAW § 442.

49. People v. Mallon, 222 N. Y. 456, 119 N. E. 102 (1918).
50. E. .q., CAL. PENAL CODE § 537 (Deering, 1941); N. Y. PENAL LAW § 925;
PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 18, § 4871 (Purdon, 1945).
51. E. .q., N. Y. PENAL LAW § 925. The law gives the hotel keeper a drastic
remedy, in cases of actual fraud, against any effort to deprive him of his lien upon
a guest's baggage. People v. Klas, 79 Misc. 452, 141 N. Y. Sup. 212 (Gen. Sess.
1913).
52. See notes 27 and 31 supra and text. The fictitious name statutes were adopted
for the protection of those who might deal with, or give credit to a fictitious entity,
or to a person dealing under an assumed name. The form of the statutes is generally
to require registration of the name, and their nature is usually penal. See CREDiT
MANUAL OF COMMECMAL LAWS, op. cit supra note 40, at 357.
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Worthless Check Laws.-The false pretense statutes have universally
been supplemented with specific statutes relating to bad checks. While
the details of the statutes differ, they are essentially the same in principle.
Under them, a maker who issues, or a holder who negotiates a check with
an intent to defraud, knowing that there are insufficient funds or credit
behind it, is guilty of a crime.63 A few jurisdictions retain the approach
that some "property" actually must have been obtained through the use
of the bad check. 54 In many states there is a provision that if the check
be paid within a certain number of days after notice, prosecution of the
drawer shall be abated, 55 but most commercial states do not so provide.
The intent to defraud is generally held to be an essential element of,
the crime even if the statute does not so require. 56 In Kansas, however,
no intent at all is necessary. 57 Most of the statutes contain a provision to
the effect that, in any prosecution, proof that the check was made or uttered
by the accused, and payment refused by the drawee because of lack of funds
or credit, establishes a prima facie case of intent to defraud and of knowledge of the insufficiency of the funds. 58 The' strength that is given these
laws by the raising of the presumption of intent to defraud cannot be overestimated. Only a few states still require that the intent to defraud be
specifically proved; 59 the shifting of the burden of proof has done a great
deal in making this law an effective deterrent sanction. In view of the
tremendous volume of checks used every day, perhaps no other penal
sanction has accomplished so much in recent times.
STRAIGHT CRMIT SALE

Where a seller of goods makes a cash sale and delivers them to the
buyer conditioned on payment of the purchase price, conversion by the
latter constitutes larceny, if done animo furandi.60 But if one instant of
credit is extended, the property becomes that of the buyer, and the obligation merely a debt.61 Under such circumstances, the seller must rely
heavily on the buyer's promise to pay and on the expectation that the
buyer will preserve his property in the same or equivalent form. Criminal
sanctions here cover only special situations.
The Making of a False Promise to Pay.-Where the buyer does not
misrepresent his financial status in writing, but merely makes a promise
53. E. g., N. Y. PENAL LAW § 1292-a; PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 18, § 4854 (Purdon,
1945). Vermont provides no criminal liability but permits civil arrest of the maker of
a check in the event the amount cannot be recovered by execution against the maker's
property.
54. E. g., ILL. STAT. ANN., c. 38, § 255 (Smith-Hurd, Supp. 1948). Under Nav
YORK PENAL LAW § 1292-a, if property is actually obtained, the offense is larceny;
otherwise, it is merely a misdemeanor.
55. CRErr MANUAL OF COmmERCIAL LAWs, op. cit. supra note 40, at 340, 341.
But see PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 18, § 4854 (Purdon, 1945) wherein the presumption does
not attach if payment is made within ten days.
56. Phillips v. State, 24 Ala. App. 456, 136 So. 480 (1931) ; Berry v. State, 153
Ga. 169, 111 S. E. 669 (1922). However, the Kentucky statute was held unconstitutional for failure to require the element of criminal intent. Burman v. Commonwealth,
228 Ky. 410, 15 S. W. 2d 256 (1929). For constitutional attacks on these laws as violating the prohibition of imprisonment for debt, see note 24 supra.
57. State v. Avery, 111 Kan. 588, 207 Pac. 838 (1922).
58. See statutes cited in note 53 supra. The Illinois statute raises the presumption
only with regard to the intent to defraud. ILL. ANN. STAT., c. 38, § 255 (Smith-Hurd,
Supp. 1948).

59. E. g., People v. Becker, 137 Cal. App. 349, 30 P. 2d 562 (2d Dist. 1934).
60. The cases are collected in Note, 20 CoL. L. REv. 318 (1920).
61. People v. Noblett, 244 N. Y. 355, 155 N. E. 670 (1927).
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to pay, not intending to keep that promise at the time it is made, the crime
of false pretenses is not committed, according to the weight of authority. 62
The dogma is that there must be a representation of a past or existing
fact. 63 Traditionally, the rule has had one modification: when the accused
has made a false promise coupled with a misrepresentation of a past or
present fact, conviction is proper even though the promise acted as an
important part of the inducement. 64 A number of courts have extended
this concept by holding that, in entering into the contract to buy goods,
the buyer impliedly represents that he intends to pay for them (to be distinguished from orally representing his ability to pay) ; if such is not his
intention, he may be found to have made a false representation. 65 So far
as moral turpitude goes, a false promise is as bad as a false representation,6 6
and since the seller depends almost entirely upon the good faith of the
buyer, such reliance should be protected. These decisions, therefore, seem
well founded. On the other hand, there is always the danger that a jury
will use hindsight to find fraud at the inception of a contract merely because
an honest debtor is now unable to pay.6 7
Fraudulent Conveyances.-Almost every jurisdiction has adopted a
law based on the statute of 13 Elizabeth,68 which made it a criminal offense
to be a party to a fraudulent conveyance. The typical statute provides that
every person who is a party to any conveyance, or transfer of any property, made with the intent to deceive, defraud, hinder or delay creditors
is guilty of an offense. 69 Most such statutes contain additional provisions
which forbid secreting or removing property to defraud creditors or to
prevent levy.70 The few decisions under these statutes, particularly recent
ones, all construe them narrowly. 71 A definite attempt to defraud must
be shown,72 although it need not be directed toward a particular creditor.73
The limitations suggested previously are particularly applicable here.7 4
62. E. g., Chaplin v. United States, 157 F. 2d 697 (D. C. Cir. 1946).
63. E. g., Rex v. Wheatley, 2 Burr. 1125, 97 Eng. Rep. 746 (K. B. 1761). See
CLARK AND MARSHALL,A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CRImEs 468 (4th ed. 1940). However, it was by judicial decision and not by the words of even the earliest statute that
this dogma was required. See Comment, 21 TULANE L. REV. 639, 645 (1947).
64. Randle v. United States, 113 F. 2d 945 (D. C. Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 311
U. S.683 (1940).
65. E. g., State v. Huckins, 212 Iowa 283, 234 N. W. 554 (1931) ; Commonwealth
v. Morrison, 252 Mass. 116, 147 N. E. 588 (1925); Commonwealth v. Walker, 108
Mass. 309 (1871) ; State v. McMahon, 49 R. I. 107, 140 At. 359 (1928).
66. See OarmLD, op. cit. supra note 34, at 138.
67. Some writers express the opinion that the criminal rule of evidence requiring
that there must be proof beyond a reasonable doubt may give adequate protection to
the accused. See OpmIEL, op. cit. mpra note 34, at 138. See also 34 HARV. L. REv.
557 (1921).
68. 13 ELz., c. 5 (1571). See 2 MoORE, FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES 1061 (1908).
69. E. g., CAL. PENAL LAW § 537 (Deering, 1941) ; N. Y. PENAL LAW § 1170.
70. E. q., N. Y. PENAL LAW § 1171; PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 18, § 4886 (Purdon,
1945).
71. E. g., State v. Marsh, 36 N. H. 196 (1858); Prough v. Entriken, 11 Pa. 81
(1849). It has been held not to apply to realty: People v. Police Justice, 41 Mich.
224, 2 N. W. 25 (1879) ; Commonwealth v. Markle, 1 York Legal Record 39 (Pa.

Q. s.1880).

72. For example, removal after levy may be larceny, Commonwealth v. Shertzer,
14 Lancaster L. Rev. 70 (Pa. Q. S. 1896) ; but where the accused merely moves to
another home with no intent to conceal the goods, no offense is committed. Commonwealth v. Wenger, 35 Lancaster L. Rev. 304 (Pa. Q. S. 1918).
73. Loomis v. People, 19 Hun 601 (N. Y. 1880).
74. Prough v. Entriken, 11 Pa. 81, 84 (1849). Here it was noted, "The Act was
intended to punish a criminal offense, not as a means of collecting debts, however just,
and to suffer it to be perverted to that purpose will necessarily lead to. great injustice and oppression."
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Other statutes have been adopted in some states to protect the seller
who relies solely on the credit of the purchaser. For example, Colorado
makes it unlawful to purchase goods on credit, and thereafter, before paying for them, to sell or hypothecate them with fraudulent intent.7 5 A
similar statute punishes the credit buyer
7 6 if he personally absconds from the
state with intent to defraud the seller.
Bulk Sales Law.-The demands of organized credit men throughout
the nation have led to the enactment of the Bulk Sales Acts, 77 which generally require that a merchant give notice to his creditors of his intention
to sell his stock or fixtures to another person.78 The object of the notice
is to give the creditor opportunity to determine whether the proposed
transfer is to be made in good faith and for a consideration adequate to
protect him. Even if notice is given, however, the sale may still be attacked as fraudulent. Under the New York law, there is no criminal provision; Pennsylvania requires that a statement listing all the vendor's creditors be given to the purchaser, and provides7 9that any wilful delivery of
an untrue or incomplete list is a misdemeanor.
Fraudulent Insolvencies.-One of the most serious of all problems

which face creditors is false or fraudulent insolvency. Since most of the
cases arise under federal law, they are excluded from this Note. It may
be pointed out, however, that bogus bankruptcies defraud creditors of more
than half a billion dollars annually, while the total loss due to robbery,
burglary, thievery, and the like amounts to less than four hundred million
dollars.80 The Credit Protection Department of the National Association
of Credit Men raises and spends hundreds of thousands of dollars each
year to prosecute commercial frauds, the majority of which is devoted to
an attempt to curtail dishonest failures. 81
SECURED SALES

The complexities of security transactions make common law concepts
of crime inadequate. Since the buyer generally wants the use of the goods
during the credit period, possession of them under most of the security
transactions must be in the purchaser. The common man's respect for
other people's property is still bound up with the tangible, visible, corporeal

element of possession.8 2 Once that leaves, the criminal law begins to falter.
Larceny, for example, protects only the possessory interest. Embezzlement and false pretenses are aimed at protecting the ownership of property,
but are inadequate since, in sales transactions, "property" is a complex
structure of part-way stages.8 3 Running throughout the sale of goods
wherever the seller attempts to secure himself is the difficult problem of
75.
165, 64
76.
77.

COLO. STAT. ANN.,
Pac. 375 (1901).

C. 48,

§ 311 (1936) ; cf. Nicholls v. McShane, 16 Colo. App.

COLO. STAT. ANN., c. 48, § 312 (1936).
CREDIT MANUAL OF COMMERCIAL LAWS, op. cit. supra note 40, at 369.
78. E. g., N. Y. PERS. PROP. LAW § 44.
79. PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 69, § 524 (Purdon, 1931).

80. BARNES AND TEETERS, NEW HoRIZONS IN CRIMINOLOGY 21 (1945).
81. CHAPIN, oP. cit. sura note 38. at 500; PRENDERGAST AND STEINER, OP. Cit.
supra note 1, at 630.
82. MANNHEIM, op. cit. supra note 6, at 100.
83. ". . . reference to the location of 'the property' in chattels as a key to determine issues is a farmer's reference, suited to a farmer's world. . . . The precise
situation to which the 'property' is not suited is the situation of commerce-in-action
. not static but in motion, not in one fist but in the spread interlocked fingers of
at least two different hands ...
" Llewellyn, Across Sales on Horseback, 52 HARV.

L. Rzv. 725, 732 (1930).
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split ownership--of property as a bundle of legal incidents divided between
buyer and seller. Each type of security transaction gives rise to special
problems of protecting the seller.
Pledge.-One of the essential characteristics of the pledge is that the
pledgee must have possession, and that the security is relinquished upon
the loss of possession. Therefore, the most conceptual view of larceny
will protect the pledgee-seller's security.
Consignment.-Since a consignment sale generally creates an agency
relationship, the fraudulent conversion or broader embezzlement statutes
would make criminal the conversion of the proceeds of the sale.8 4 Even
if the contract creates a del credere agency-where the consignee guarantees to the consignor that the buyers will pay the purchase price-the
agent does not acquire the right to keep the money and to owe it merely
as a debt; if he diverts it to his own use, it is embezzlement. 8 5
Pennsylvania Baihnent-Lease.-Priorto the adoption of the Uniform
Conditional Sales Act in 1925, the chief security device in Pennsylvania was the so-called bailment-lease. Since title remains in the bailor
and sale of the goods is technically not contemplated,8 6 conversion of the
property is criminal.81 It has also been held that where the owner of goods
is induced into parting with them under the terms of a bailment-lease, by
trick or artifice, the offense amounts to larceny if done aninio furandi.s8
Conditional Sale.-In the conditional sale, possession of the goods is
given to the purchaser, while title remains in the seller until the full purchase price is paid. The seller relies primarily on the tangible element of
credit; he secures himself by retention of title in the goods conditionally
sold. To be protected adequately, the seller must be assured that the
buyer will not sell the goods and convert the proceeds, or remove them
from the jurisdiction in which the seller may seize them on default. Since
the buyer has secured possession of the goods lawfully, and has not obtained
title by fraud, the common law crimes are inadequate to afford this protection. States which have failed to adopt remedial legislation have held
that sale or removal of the goods is a mere breach of contract.8 9 In most
jurisdictions, however, it is made a crime to injure, destroy or conceal
goods subject to a conditional sale, with the intent to defraud the seller, or
to remove them from the filing district, or to sell, mortgage, or otherwise
84. Conviction has been obtained under an embezzlement by consignee statute.

PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 18, § 4826 (Purdon, 1945), Commonwealth v. Winkel, 24 Pa.
Dist. 404 (Q. S. 1915) ; but consignees have been held not guilty under the broadly
construed larceny by bailee statute. People v. Gualano, 349 Ill. 235, 181 N. E. 643
(1932) ; People v. Feldstein, 273 Ill. App. 47 (1st Dist. 1933).
85. State v. McAvoy, 40 R. I. 437, 101 Atl. 109 (1917) ; Commonwealth v. Smith,
29 Schuylkill Legal Record 184 (Pa. Q. S. 1931).
86. S. F. Bowser & Co. v. Franklin Mortgage & Inv. Co., 305 Pa. 459, 158 Atl.
170 (1931) (if sale, rather than use, is contemplated, the transaction cannot be given
the usual incidents of a bailment-lease).
87. Commonwealth v. Petres, 2 Somerset Legal Journal 296 (Pa. Q. S. 1924).
What effect the Williams case has on such a decision is speculative. See note 117

infra.

88. Commonwealth v. Mendenhall, 20 Pa. D. & C. 227 (Q. S. 1934).
89. The Illinois statutes do not impose criminal liability on a conditional buyer
who disposes of the goods held under a conditional sale contract with intent to defraud
the seller. The Illinois Attorney General has expressed the opinion that the buyer
in such a case cannot be prosecuted under the chattel mortgage penal sanctions, nor
under the larceny by bailee statute. ILL. Ors. ATr'Y GEN. 380 (1928) ; cf. People v.
Robinson, 352 Ill. 596, 186 N. E. 484 (1933).
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dispose of them under a claim of ownership. 90 The Uniform Conditional
Sales Act, adopted in nine states, has a similar provision. 91 The statutes
generally require an intent to defraud the conditional seller, and it has
been held that the mere resale of the goods
before final payment is in92
sufficient to establish a prima facie case.
Chattel Mortgages.-Criminalsanctions are even more widely adopted
in regard to mortgages on personalty. There are two types of statutes.
The first makes it a crime to sell, conceal, or dispose of property subject
to a mortgage with intent to defraud. 93 The other, more complex,
makes it an offense to remove the property from the county with intent
to defraud the mortgagee, and without his written consent. This latter
statute also prohibits the sale of the goods without obtaining written permission from the mortgagee, and informing the prospective purchaser of the
encumbrance. 94 While removal from the jurisdiction presents the same
problem to the chattel mortgagee as it does to the conditional vendor,
Pennsylvania makes such removal of mortgaged property operate only as
a civil default. 95 Illinois, on the other hand, creates criminal liability in
its chattel mortgage law, but refuses to extend it to conditional sales. 96
Texas, however, has drafted its9chattel
mortgage statute to bring the con7
ditional sale within its purview.
The cases decided under the statutes which forbid removal from the
county usually require proof of an intent to defraud, to establish a prima
facie case.98 If the indictment is drawn, however, under the section of the
statute which prohibits sale without the consent of the mortgagee and notice
to the purchaser, cases are legion which hold that no intent to defraud need
be alleged or proved; proof of the commission of the forbidden act constitutes a prima facie case.9 9 Once the act is done, neither subsequent payment 100 nor agreement with the mortgagee 101 is a defense to prosecution.
Trust Receipt.-The pure trust receipt device, widely used in financing
such items as automobiles, is sui generis in that full legal title is derived
by the entruster (usually a bank or finance company) directly from the
original seller to whom the entruster pays the purchase price.102 The
90. E. g., N. Y. PERS. PROP. LAW § 75; PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 69, § 433 (Purdon,
1945).
91. UNIFORM

CONDITIONAL SALEs Acr § 15.

92. Commonwealth v. Reed, 150 Mass. 67, 22 N. E. 434 (1889).
v. Gluck, 188 N. Y. 167, 80 N. E. 1022 (1907).
93. N. Y. PENAL LAW § 940.
94. E. g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 538 (Deering, 1941).
95. PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 21, § 940.7 (Purdon, Supp. 1948).

96. See note 89 supra.

But cf. People

97. TEx. PENAL CODE, Arts. 1556, 1557, 1558 (Vernon, Supp. 1948).
98. People v. Wolfrom, 15 Cal. App. 732, 115 Pac. 1088 (1st Dist. 1911) ; People
v. Staton, 79 App. Div. 634, 80 N. Y. Supp. 2 (2d Dep't 1903). However, in Michigan, at least the language 'of the statute does not require such proof: MICH. STAT.
ANN. § 28.649 (Callaghan, 1938).
99. People v. Phillips, 30 Cal. App. 31, 157 Pac. 1003 (2d Dist. 1916); Crosswhite v. People, 110 Colo. 584, 137 P. 2d 399 (1943) ; Commonwealth v. Cutler, 153
Mass. 252, 26 N. E. 855 (1891) (where the statutes required no intent) ; Bower v.
Borland, 257 Mich. 306, 241 N. W. 201 (1932) (where a presumption was raised).
100. People v. Iden, 24 Cal. App. 627, 142 Pac. 117 (2d Dist. 1914).
101. Nall v. State, 133 Tex. Cr. Rep. 146, 109 S. W 2d 492 (1937).
102. The pure trust receipt is unique in this respect. Use in domestic transactions,
however, has led to considerable deviation from the pure transaction. In the so-called
two-party trust receipt, the financer owns the goods in its own right. See Hanna,
Trust Receipts, 29 CoL. L. REv. 545 (1929). This apparently would have made some
difference, but UNIFORM TRUST REcEIPTs AcT § 2 removes any distinction in regard
to the source of title as long as the described situation is reached. Gilmore, Chattel
Security: II, 57 YALE L. 3. 761, 765 (1948).'
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seller-entruster delivers the goods directly to the dealer, who executes a
trust receipt whereby he agrees to hold the goods in trust. The Uniform
Trust Receipts Act contains no criminal provisions, and the states have
failed to provide specific criminal protection. 10 3 Since the sale of the
goods by the trustee-dealer is within the contemplation of the parties, the
danger to the entruster is that the dealer will convert the proceeds.
Pennsylvania Trust Receipt Situation.-Although the trust receipt
was first recognized in Pennsylvania as far back as 1894,104 the conversion
of the proceeds derived from the sale of goods is still not considered
criminal. Prior to 1928, two lower court decisions had held dealers guilty
of fraudulent conversion when proceeds were withheld under a trust receipt arrangement. 10 5 In Commonwealth v. Williams, 0 6 however, the
Pennsylvania Superior Court announced a different rule. The facts of the
case presented a typical trust receipt transaction; the indictment was drawn
under the larceny by bailee statute, for the conversion of several automobiles. Although the agreement stipulated that the cars were not to be
sold, the conduct of both parties showed clearly that the sale of the automobiles was contemplated by the entruster. It was the failure to account
for the proceeds, not the sale of the cars, which motivated the criminal
prosecution. Reversing the conviction, however, the appellate court said
that the real purpose of the transaction was merely to secure payment for
the loan made to the accused. Noting that the cars were to be sold by the
accused and the proceeds paid to the finance company, it pointed out that
the latter never was in possession of the cars, and that it never was intended that they be returned. 10 7 While the argument aims primarily at
negativing the existence of a bailment,, the implication is clear that the
court thought the accused merely owed the finance company a debt. Although the holding might be narrowed to announce the inapplicability of
the larceny by bailee statute to this factual situation, the whole tenor of
the opinion makes it probable that conviction for conversion of the proceeds will be impossible under any present Pennsylvania criminal statute.
No reported case since 1928 has been found involving this point;
however, the issue was presented squarely in an unreported case in Philadelphia County. 0 8 There the indictment was framed under the fraudulent
conversion statute. The evidence showed that the defendant had sold automobiles held under a trust receipt arrangement and had converted the
proceeds to his own use. On demurrer to the evidence, the court considered the Williams case controlling and directed a verdict of acquittal,
holding that the relationship between the parties was that of debtor and
creditor.
Assignment of Accounts Receivable.-A lien on proceeds exists where
a seller of goods assigns an account receivable to a financer, but, in order
to retain the good will of his customers, undertakes to collect them him103. While many states provide that embezzlement by a trustee is a crime, this
statute has not been used in connection with the trust receipt device since the Uniform Trust Receipts Act specifically provides that the "trustee" shall be considered such
only for the purposes of the Act itself.
104. Brown Bros. & Co. v. Billington, 163 Pa. 76, 29 At. 904 (1894).
105. Commonwealth v. Richley. 41 York Legal Record 17 (Pa. Q. S. 1927);
Commonwealth v. Miller, 18 Schuylkill Legal Record 401 (Pa. Q. S. 1922); cf.
Commonwealth v. Wooden, 94 Pa. Super. 452 (1928).
106. 93 Pa. Super. 92 (1928).
107. Id. at 100.
108. Commonwealth v. Kerbeck, No. 835, Pa. Q. S., Oct. 17, 1939.
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self. 10 9 In such a situation, criminal liability depends upon the agreement
between the parties. If the assignor is to hold the money in a separate
account for the financer, or is to indorse checks received to that account,
he may be held criminally responsible for the misappropriation of such
funds. 110 On the other hand, where the agreement provides that the money
may be placed in the assignor's own account, and settlement is made
periodically, use of such funds is not criminal. The determinative factor
should be the use to which the funds may be put, not the mere fact that
settlement is to be made periodically. Under the doctrine of Benedict v.
n
if the use of the collected proceeds by the assignor is "unfetRatner,"
tered," the assignment is fraudulent at law. This test is also applicable to
the issue of criminal responsibility for conversion." 2 Even where the
contract calls for the money to be placed in a separate account, continued
acquiescence by the financer to an exercise of dominion over the funds
by the assignor should preclude any protection from the criminal law.
CONCLUSION

Extension of the criminal law to protect credit has been attacked by
those who fear its use as a mere collection process. Clearly, however,
modern business dealings must receive some such protection. As the result
of steady pressure, many state statutes today attempt to deter dishonesty
among buyers of goods on credit." 3 One major defect, however, is revealed by an examination of existing law. Although it is a crime for the
conditional vendee to so much as remove the secured property out of the
county, he is exculpated if he sells the property with the consent of the
vendor and converts the proceeds." 4 A mortgagor who sells the encumbranced property without authority may be imprisoned, but if he sells
the property with the consent of the mortgagee and fraudulently withholds
the proceeds, he cannot be prosecuted." 5 Likewise, where property is
subject to a trust receipt arrangement contemplating sale by the "trustee,"
and the latter converts the proceeds of that sale, he is only a debtor." 6
In most instances, the reservation of title in the goods is afforded
protection. But when title to those goods is transferred to a bona fide purchaser, the courts are usually unwilling to find a property interest in the
proceeds of the sale, and refuse to impose criminal liability when the holder
converts them to his own use. Where the agreement between the parties
is such that the buyer may use the proceeds derived from the resale of
the seller's goods, and merely must account periodically to the seller, the
seller loses whatever property interest he had and becomes a mere creditor.
Similarly, where continued practice or custom between the parties allows
109. This is the so-called assignment on a non-notification basis; its use is fully
discussed in SAULNIER AND JAcosY, AccouNTs REcEIvABLE FINANCING (1943) passim.
See also Koessler, Assignment of Accounts Receivable, 33 CALIF. L. REV. 40 (1945).
110. State v. Parker, 112 Conn. 39, 151 Atl. 325 (1930) ; State v. Carmean, 126
Iowa 291, 102 N. W. 97 (1905) ; cf. Commonwealth v. Willstein, 146 Pa. Super. 357,
22 A. 2d 613 (1941) (assignment of a judgment for collection).
111. 268 U. S. 353 (1925).
112. For the application of the "unfettered use" doctrine to this situation, see Taylor, The Collection of Accounts Receivable, 25 MINN. L. REv. 201, 202 (1941).
113. Compare the effect that criminal sanctions of the state Blue Sky Laws have
had as a deterrent force: see MTcHAEL AND WECHSLER, op. cit. szpra note 22, at 468.
. . . nothing so much instills fear into the minds of fraudulent stock operators as
criminal prosecution." REP. ArT'Y GEN. N. Y. 49 (1933).
114. State v. Sheets, 217 Ind. 676, 30 N. E. 2d 309 (1940).
115. Dempsey v. State, 94 Ga. 766, 22 S. E. 57 (1894) (title state) ; Daniels v.
State, 100 Tex. Cr. Rep. 493, 272 S. W. 143 (1925) (lien state).
116. Commonwealth v. Kerbeck, No. 835, Pa. Q. S., Oct. 17, 1939.
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the buyer to handle the funds as his own, notwithstanding a contract to the
contrary, the buyer cannot be held criminally liable for misuse of the funds
or for insolvency. Where the parties themselves, however, agree that
title is to remain in the seller or financer, and where no third party claimants are involved, the agreement should be controlling. Criminal sanctions
are needed where the contract between the buyer and seller admits a property interest in the latter, and calls for an immediate accounting of the
proceeds on resale. The same penalties which are imposed to protect the
seller's interest in the goods should be extended to safeguard the interest
he has in the proceeds.
In the eighteenth century the law of larceny faced a similar problem
in the narrowness of the concept of possession," 7 which was overcome only
by the enactment of remedial legislation. Today an equally conceptual
notion of "property" has led our courts to pronounce the proceeds from
the sale of the seller's goods a mere debt. It is submitted that such decisions give carte blanche to a thief and allow him to operate within the law.
The consignee who converts the proceeds from the sale of the consignor's
goods is guilty of embezzlement." s Is the difference merely that in this
transaction the converter is called an agent-a familiar common law
concept?
Progress has been made by states which have adopted the consolidated
theft statutes." 9 Procedurally, at least, they have freed themselves from
the web of refined distinctions anong the traditional commercial crimes.
A suitable substitute is the so-called fraudulent conversion statute which
provides that any person in possession, in any capacity, of goods belonging to any other person, or which that person is entitled to receive, who
fraudulently converts or withholds said goods or the proceeds derived
from the sale thereof, is guilty of a crime. 120 Although Pennsylvania
has
2
adopted this statute, it has not been used to full advantage.' '
Today it is difficult to imagine a society in which the law provided
no penalty for the swindler who obtained property by false pretenses, but
at the same time imprisoned an indigent laborer who failed to pay promptly
for his family's bread. Somewhere between these two extremes lies an
avenue where credit transactions can be protected properly, without a
commercially depressing effect. Penalizing dishonest conduct to preserve
the credit economy benefits society as a whole, since the seeker of credit
himself would suffer most if credit sales were abated or curtailed because
of insufficient legal protection. But as long as the criminal law is based
on a conception of property which was formed in an immobile agricultural
economy, it must inevitably be inadequate. 22 Criminal sanctions based on
a concept of "commerce-in-action" have been, and can be, a vital aid in
actually fostering a complex credit economy.
A. N. R., Jr.
117. See note 10 supra and text.
118. See note 85 upra and text.
119. E. g., CALIF. PENAL CODE § 484 (Deering, 1941) ; N. Y. PENAL LAW § 1290.
120. E. g., PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 18, § 4834 (Purdon, 1945). Illinois has given its
larceny by bailee statute a very broad interpretation, perhaps broad enough to cover
the conversion of proceeds. ILL. ANN. STAT., tit. 38, § 394 (Smith-Hurd, 1935) ; cf.
People v. Barnard, 327 Ill. 305, 158 N. E. 729 (1927) ; Bergman v. People, 177 Ill.
244, 52 N. E. 363 (1898).
121. E. g., Commonwealth v. Mitchneck, 130 Pa. Super. 433, 198 At. 463 (1938);
Commonwealth v. Hillpot, 84 Pa. Super. 454 (1925).
122. See MANNHEIM, op. cd. supra note 6, at 99.

